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1 This paper was presented at an Economic Policy workshop in Paris, October 25th, 2008. 1. Introduction 
 
 
This paper investigates whether elections in developing countries have improved 
economic policies and economic governance. Both casual empiricism and casual 
theorizing suggest that they have done so. As contested elections have become more 
common since the 1990s, the policy ratings from the World Bank and the International 
Country Risk Guide have both improved markedly. These improvements accord with the 
fundamental notion that elections discipline governments into good performance.  
 
Yet this view from on high often collides with the actual experience of individual 
elections. The Kenyan election of December 2007 triggered a catastrophic implosion of 
the society, polarizing it on ethnic lines. To date, the legacy of that election is a policy 
paralysis: for example, the number of government ministers has been doubled with a 
resulting loss of policy coherence. In Zimbabwe the prospect of contested elections in 
2002 and 2008 clearly failed to discipline President Mugabe into adopting good 
economic policies: he chose hyperinflation, using the revenues to finance patronage. The 
most celebrated economic reform episode in Africa is Nigeria 2003-6, when a group of 
technocrats led by Ngozi Nkonjo-Iweala as Minister of Finance turned the economy 
around. This episode was ushered in by the replacement of a military dictator, General 
Abacha, with an elected president, Obasanjo, suggesting that elections indeed improved 
government performance. However, reform only began in Obasanjo’s second and final 
term, when he no longer faced the discipline of an election. He told Nkonjo-Iweala that 
the window for reform was only three years, not the full four years of his term: as he said, 
‘the last year will be politics’.
2 Indeed, that Nigeria failed to harness the first oil boom 
was primarily the responsibility of a democratic government, elected in 1978. That 
government adopted very poor economic policies, including borrowing heavily in order 
to finance public consumption; it was also famously corrupt. Despite its disastrous 
performance it was re-elected in 1983. As these examples suggest, in the conditions 
typical of many developing countries, elections may be two-edged swords. 
 
The effect of elections on policy in low-income countries is of considerable importance. 
Since aid was first used conditionally to promote ‘Structural Adjustment’ in the 1980s the 
international community has recognized that policy improvement is fundamental to 
development. During the 1990s the approach to how good policies should be promoted 
shifted from conditionality, which was increasingly seen as both ineffective and 
unacceptable, to the promotion of democracy. Electorates rather than donors would 
coerce governments into good performance. At the core of the promotion of democracy 
was the promotion of elections: for example, in 2006 donors provided $500m to finance 
elections in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Yet the premise that elections are 
effective in such conditions has yet to be evaluated. At a more pragmatic level, since 
elections periodize political decision taking, they might also periodize policy reform: 
some times might be ripe for good policy. For example, it would be useful both to 
political leaders and to donors to know whether the year just prior to an election is indeed 
unsuited to policy reform as President Obasanjo evidently thought.    
                                                 
2 Personal communication to one of the authors.  
There is a large general literature on the relationship between democracy and economic 
performance but it does not provide much guidance as to these questions. The conclusion 
from the literature is that any such relationship is weak (Drazen, 2000; Feng, 2003; 
Przeworski  et al., 2000). However, these studies do not focus specifically on the 
characteristics prevalent in developing countries many of which democratized during the 
1990s. Several recent studies find that democracy has distinctive effects in the context of 
such characteristics. Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) and Collier (2001) focus on the 
consequences of ethnic diversity for growth. They find that diverse societies benefit 
significantly more from democracy than homogenous societies. Collier and Rohner 
(2008) focus on the relationship between democracy and the risk of large-scale political 
violence. They find that whereas in developed economies democracy increases security, 
below an income threshold of around $2,700 per capita it significantly increases the risk 
of political violence. Finally, Collier and Hoeffler (2008) focus on the relationship 
between democracy and the economic performance of resource-rich countries. They find 
that whereas below a threshold of resource wealth democracy is significantly beneficial, 
above the threshold it significantly worsens performance. These results suggest that no 
simple model of how democracy affects economic policy may be globally applicable. 
Models designed to describe how elections affect political incentives in OECD societies 
may prove seriously misleading if applied to contexts such as Afghanistan and the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo. Our purpose in this paper is to investigate empirically 
the various effects of elections. As we discuss in Section 2, since there are potentially 
several distinct and offsetting effects, an appropriate empirical strategy needs to 
distinguish between them: simple composite empirical measures are likely to be 
misleading.   
 
In many developing countries governments are failing to provide their citizens with the 
rudiments of social provision and economic opportunities now considered both normal 
and feasible. A reasonable inference is that in such states the ruling politicians are either 
ill-motivated or incompetent. We focus directly on policies rather than on economic 
outcomes. The typical developing country is subject to large shocks that introduce much 
noise into the mapping from policy choices to outcomes and we are concerned with the 
variables that are more directly under the control of politicians. The direct observation of 
policies is difficult, but in this respect the researcher is at an advantage over the 
electorate. We rely upon two international data sets which rate economic policies and 
governance, neither of which has been available to citizens of rated countries. Hence, 
while citizens must largely rely upon observable economic performance, we are able to 
observe policies directly, albeit with the limitations implied by these international rating 
systems. In Section 2 we discuss the theory which informs our empirical analysis. We 
show that while democracy may have both structural and cyclical effects on policy, a 
priori there are offsetting effects so that the net effect is ambiguous: the issue must 
therefore be resolved empirically. In Section 3 we discuss our empirical strategy: no one 
approach is ideal and so we test the robustness of each against the reasonable alternatives. 
In Section 4 we present our core results, subjecting them to a range of robustness tests in 
Section 5. Section 6 extends the analysis to those developing countries at the extremes of 
poverty and poor policies, and investigates possible interactions between elections and other political variables. Section 7 draws out the implications for policy, both in terms of 
international support for the process of policy reform, and for the better functioning of 
the new low-income democracies.   
 
 
2. A Theoretical Overview 
 
 
Elections can affect economic policy both through their effect on the incentives facing 
politicians and through selection. By making politicians accountable to citizens they 
increase the incentive to adopt socially beneficial economic policies.  Selection is both a 
direct consequence of electoral choice and, more fundamentally, because if politicians are 
accountable the profession becomes more attractive for people who aspire to further the 
public good and less attractive for people who are ill-motivated (Besley, 2006). Hence, 
through both incentives and selection elections may enhance political motivation to adopt 
good policies. Further, an elected government may face lower costs of doing so. By 
conferring legitimacy elections might make it easier to face down vested interests that 
oppose reform. 
 
However, in addition to the structural change of accountability, elections introduce 
friction. Elections are periodic events the timing of which may affect the incentives 
facing politicians. In particular, elections as events may disrupt policy. If elections affect 
policies both structurally and cyclically the empirical relationship between elections and 
policies may appear confused because of opposing effects. Elections may improve the 
average level of policies, yet worsen them in the short run. In this paper we try to 
disentangle the two effects. 
 
 
2.1. Cyclical Effects of Elections 
 
Elections are periodic events. One effect of an election is to create a discrete difference 
between the period prior to the election during which the government is in power and on 
which it may be judged by voters, and the period after the election when it may not be in 
power. This introduces an incentive for the government to improve its record by 
transferring resources from expenditures that only generate observable benefits after the 
election to those that generate observable benefits prior to the election. There is indeed 
some evidence in support of the short-term bias of democratic governments: they invest 
less than autocracies (Tavares and Wacziarg, 2001). Reform, by its nature, is a form of 
investment: short term political costs are incurred for longer term benefits. An 
implication is that as an election approaches the ratio of pre-election to post-election 
effects of policy reform falls and so the incentive to reform diminishes. Hence, the pace 
of reform might slow, or even become negative, as the election approaches. For example, 
in run-up to the Zambian election of 1991 President Kaunda increased the money supply 
by 400 percent, and in the run-up to the Zimbabwean election of 2008 President Mugabe 
confiscated foreign currency bank accounts and distributed the proceeds. 
 Elections are fought not just on the past record of the government but on promises: they 
are occasions when politicians make future policy commitments. In many developing 
countries the electorate lacks both the education and information properly to evaluate 
these commitments: the media are both highly partisan and lack the capacity for specialist 
analysis of economic policy, and in any case many voters are illiterate. Elections thus 
expose the society to the risk of political promises based on economic populism. For 
example, in South Africa in 2008 the electoral contest between Jacob Zuma and Thabo 
Mbeki for the leadership of the ruling ANC clearly pitched economic populism versus 
economic prudence: populism won by 9:1. A legacy of an election may therefore be a 
period in which policy reform is hamstrung by the need to implement some of these 
commitments.   
 
Each of these short term effects of elections would give rise to a cycle, potentially in 
either the level of policy or the pace of reform. The shortening horizon would predict a 
gradual deterioration as the next election approached, while the legacy of populist 
commitments would predict gradual policy improvement. Empirically, there are four 
possibilities. Neither of the effects might be significant in which case there would be no 
electoral policy cycle. The shortening horizons effect might predominate, in which case 
the policy cycle would be a saw-tooth of post-election deterioration. The populist legacy 
effect might predominate, in which case the saw-tooth would have the opposite slope, 
with gradual post-election improvement. Finally, the potency of each effect might recede 
with the time to the pertinent election, forward-looking for shortening horizons, 
backward-looking for populist legacies. Thus, the shortening horizons effect might matter 
most in the period immediately prior to an election, as our examples illustrate, while the 
populist legacy effect might matter most in the period immediately after an election. In 
this case, rather than a saw-tooth, there would be a genuine cycle in which the level or 
pace of improvement of policy was at its peak around the mid-point between elections.  
 
The relative importance of the two effects also determines how elections should be dated 
in empirical analysis. If the only significant effect is that of shortening horizons then the 
theory implies that the empirical measure should be forward-looking: the time to the next 
election. In this case, if data are organized as annual observations, an election in January 
has virtually no effect in the year of the election and elections in the first half of the year 
are better re-assigned to the previous year. Conversely, if the only significant effect is 
populist legacy, elections in the second half of the year are better re-assigned to the next 
year. Only if the two effects are similarly potent is the election best left in the year in 
which it occurred.  
 
The evidence on whether political cycles are important is mixed. In developed countries, 
where democracies are more mature and information is good, the consensus is that there 
is no cycle. However, there is some evidence that cycles are significant in developing 
countries. To date, work has focused on budget deficits. Shi and Svensson (2006) find 
that political budget cycles are significantly more pronounced in developing than in 
developed countries. Similarly, Brender and Drazen (2005) show that in their sample of 
developed and developing economies political budget cycles are confined to the “new democracies”. Block (2002) finds that in developing countries the fiscal deficit increases 
in election years and is followed by post-election retrenchments.  
 
 
2.2. Structural effects 
 
Democracy is widely seen as the best system of government despite such cyclical effects. 
The case for democracy rests on its structural effects: increasing the accountability and 
legitimacy of government. The accountability effect is straightforward: faced with an 
election, a government may need to attract votes by adopting policies which are good for 
citizens, or at least good for the median voter. The legitimacy effect is not usually 
modelled but may also be important. It is that a government which has acquired power 
through winning an election has a mandate to implement its commitments and the wide 
recognition of this mandate reduces the ability of those opposed to these policies to block 
them. 
 
Although elections hold government to account and confer legitimacy, they only do so 
periodically. The periodicity of elections is likely to affect the intensity of these effects as 
well as introducing the possibility of a cycle. A plausible hypothesis is that the greater the 
frequency of elections the more closely is the government held to account and the greater 
its legitimacy in enacting its policies. Variations in the frequency of elections thus 
provide an empirical measure of these structural effects.   
 
While the ‘accountability and legitimacy’ model may be applicable, it is by no means 
inevitable. We now consider how it might be undermined, ultimately to the point at 




Information about economic policy is costly and because of the free-rider problem 
individual voters have very little incentive to acquire it. As a result voters may not be 
able to monitor government performance. Besley (2006) rigorously analyzes this 
problem. Observable economic outcomes may be dependent upon many influences 
outside the control of the politician, a condition likely in the shock-prone and media-
scarce conditions of many developing countries. As the ability of voters to monitor the 
politician deteriorates, at some point the electoral advantage from good policies becomes 
too small to offset the rent-seeking advantages which a dishonest politician would value. 
Crucially, once this point is reached, rent-seekers are attracted to politics, honest people 
are consequently discouraged, and the pool of candidates deteriorates: voters end up 




Voters may hold strong ethnic allegiances which predetermine their support, making 
votes unresponsive to performance (Bossuroy, 2007; Fridy, 2007). This in turn weakens 
the incentive for governments to depart from patronage politics to provide the national public good of policy reform. For example, consider the elections of December 2007 in 
Kenya, which has long been regarded as one of the more successful and advanced 
African economies. The presidential election pitted an incumbent Kikuyu against a Luo 
challenger. Even among Luo voters President Kibaki had a remarkably high approval 
rating: those giving him a favourable rating outnumbered those disapproving by 
44%:14% (Dercon et al., 2008). Yet 98% of Luo intended to vote for the Luo candidate. 
Evidently, the need to win an election provided President Kibaki little incentive to adopt 
policies other than those that favoured the Kikuyu. Similarly, in a remarkable field 
experiment in Benin in which candidates varied their electoral message randomly across 
localities, Wantchekon (2003) found that promises of ethnic patronage were more 
effective than promises of national public goods in attracting votes.  
 
Many developing countries, especially in Africa, are highly ethnically diverse and these 
sub-national identities trump the relatively recent introduction of national identities 
(Collier, 2009). As with poor voter information, above some threshold of identity voting, 
the difference between good and bad policies has too little effect on voting to deter 
‘unprincipled’ politicians from seeking office and so the pool of candidates deteriorates.  
 
Illicit tactics  
 
Governments may win elections through illicit strategies such as ballot fraud, bribery and 
intimidation. Recent analysis of the Nigerian election by Collier and Vicente (2008) has 
shown that all three features were not just widespread but were used strategically. 
Through a randomized experiment that succeeded in reducing violence in selected 
locations, they are also able to show that where a party adopted the strategy of violence it 
was effective, reducing the turnout of those who support other parties. Similarly, in a 
randomized experiment in Sao Tome, Vicente (2007) was able to show that bribery was 
effective. 
 
These illicit strategies may well be more than convenient supplements to the desired 
strategy of adopting good economic policies. If politicians are ill-motivated and wish to 
maintain dysfunctional policies which are personally advantageous, they may adopt the 
illicit strategies in order to free themselves from the need for good policies.   
 
Whether governments are able to resort to illicit tactics depends upon dimensions of 
democracy other than elections. Whereas elections describe the technology by which a 
government  acquires power, checks and balances determine how government uses 
power. The new democracies tend to have lop-sided democracy because elections, being 
discrete events, can be introduced much more readily than checks and balances, which 
are continuous processes. Further, the private incentive for political parties to contest 
elections is considerable, whereas checks and balances are public goods and so likely to 
be under-provided by private action. The under-provision of checks and balances is 
compounded because governments have an incentive not to substitute for the lack of 
private provision. The implication is that many of the new low-income democracies may 
lack the social and constitutional pre-conditions for elections to provide an effective 
discipline on government performance. The most damaging scenario would be if in order to adopt the illicit strategies the government undermines the rule of law: in this case 
elections would induce policy deterioration. From the perspective of an ill-motivated 
incumbent the switch from autocracy to electoral competition may be viewed as technical 
regress in the retention of power. The privately optimal response may be to adopt more 
costly means of power retention. 
 
Where these illicit strategies are rife an election may fail to establish the accountability of 
government for its performance. It may also reduce the perceived legitimacy of 
government. For example, once President Kibaki was perceived to have won the Kenyan 
election through ballot fraud, opposition to his regime was far stronger than that against 
the former Kenyan autocrats, Kenyatta and Moi. Combined with the undermining of 
checks and balances as incumbents resort to more costly strategies of power retention, 
elections might therefore retard reform. A recent result by Kudamatsu (2007) provides 
some support for this hypothesis that the consequences of elections depend upon how 
they are conducted. Using changes in infant mortality as a measure of the performance of 
African governments, he finds that only in those rare cases in which the incumbent 
government has lost the election does performance improve. Since the illicit tactics 
greatly favour incumbents, those elections in which the incumbent loses are likely to have 





The above discussion has three implications for an empirical strategy of the effect of 
elections on policy. First, political cycles are complicated: neither the dating of 
observations nor the functional form of any relationship can be determined a priori. 
Second, the structural effect of democracy in the conditions prevailing in many 
developing countries is a priori ambiguous: the triumph of accountability cannot simply 
be assumed. Third, if elections have both cyclical and structural effects, neither can be 
investigated in isolation.  
 
As noted, in most low-income countries contested elections are recent and follow a phase 
of autocracy in which economic policies were highly dysfunctional. Of course, the 
apparent association between democracy and policy improvement may be coincidental. 
An alternative simple interpretation is that elites have learnt from past failure. Even if in 
the long run democracy leads to a better level of policy, the recent observed phase may be 
a gradual adjustment out of disequilibrium: the observable relationship may be between 
democracy and the rate of policy improvement towards an equilibrium level. Hence, we 
will investigate both the relationship in levels (and its transformation into the relationship 
between changes in democracy and changes in policy), and the adjustment relationship 
between the level of democracy and the change in policy conditional upon the attained 




 3. Empirical Strategy and Presentation of the Data 
 
 
3.1. Estimation Method 
 
The dependent variable in our analysis is economic policy and governance rather than 
economic performance. This has the important advantage of being under the direct 
control of the government, but it poses a distinct set of difficulties. Economic policies and 
governance are multidimensional and so must be aggregated. Some of these dimensions 
are not readily mapped onto a cardinal scale.  Our core measure is the Country Policy and 
Institutional Assessment (CPIA) of the World Bank. A precise definition of the CPIA is 
presented in Appendix 1. It is an annual rating system for twenty different aspects of 
economic policy and institutions that covers around 130 countries since 1977. This has 
several important advantages and some severe disadvantages. It is available for a long 
period, 1977-2004, and is intended to be comparable across countries and, with minor 
qualifications, over time. It is intended to assess the overall economic efficacy of 
government choices regarding policies and institutions. The CPIA also has strong 
disadvantages. Although clear criteria are set out for the ratings, it is subjective. The 
ratings are given annually by economists who are staff of the World Bank specialized on 
the country. More senior economics staff then adjust these ratings so as to be comparable 
both within and across regions.  A common objection to the CPIA is that it inadvertently 
incorporates growth outcomes: staff working on a rapidly growing economy will tend to 
assess policies and institutions more favourably than objectively similar policies and 
institutions in a slow-growing economy. A second common criticism is that the ratings 
reflect World Bank opinions about policy which are at times contentious. This is likely to 
be more serious in some contexts than others. In the range of very poor economic policies 
common during the 1980s in much of Africa the direction of change in World Bank 
ratings is likely to be fairly uncontroversial. An example is Uganda during the 1990s. 
There is good objective evidence of major policy improvement during this period. In the 
first years of the decade the Ministry of Finance lost control of the economy and inflation 
reached 230%. This persuaded President Museveni to replace his economic team with a 
group of technocrats who had previously been critics of policy. As this group gradually 
gained the confidence of the president they were able to implement a widening agenda of 
economic policy reforms. Most notably, public spending was restrained through a ‘cash 
budget’; the administered exchange rate was replaced first by an auction and then by an 
inter-bank market; the state bank was privatized; and the state monopoly on transporting 
coffee exports was lifted. These improvements were recognized in the international 
private sector: the country’s rating by Institutional Investor, based on a poll of informed 
observers, rose from around 6/100 to over 20/100. The CPIA fully reflected these 
improvements, rising from a low level of 2.5 early in the decade to 4.0. The ICRG, which 
we will use as a robustness check, also improves from 30/100 to 60/100. All these 
reforms were entirely in line with standard economic analysis and so could not 
reasonably be seen as contentious within the profession, although they were of course 
contentious politically. The CPIA is likely to be more contentious within the economics 
profession where reforms involve a complex transition such as that which occurred in 
Eastern Europe. Since there were at the time open professional disputes about the pace and sequencing of reform the CPIA must be seen as merely reflecting one institutional 
position.   
 
The CPIA is ordinal in nature. Each of its twenty components is rated on a scale from 1 
to 6. Because it is an average of twenty components the CPIA can take all the values 
within this range, as illustrated by Table 1. Our core use of this ordinal variable is to 
create a dummy variable which takes the value of unity in any year in which the CPIA 
has improved relative to the previous year. Another approach we adopt is to classify the 
CPIA into nine bands as shown in Table 1 and assign a ranking with which we estimate 
an ordered probit. Both of these approaches involve a loss of information. This is the 
price to be paid for respecting the ordinal nature of the variable: there is little sense in 
which an improvement from 2 to 3 is equivalent to an improvement from 3 to 4. 
However, the maximum potential information is to be achieved from ignoring these 
concerns and treating the CPIA as though it were cardinal. We therefore also investigate 
these variants, both in levels and in differences.  
 
 
Table 1. Country Policy and Institutional Assessment, 1978-2004, 82 countries. 
CPIA  Ordered CPIA  Observations  of which CPIA equals  Observations  Percentage 
[1 – 1.5 [  1  65 1 43  66.2
[1.5 – 2 [  2  46      
[2 – 2.5 [  3  216 2 50  23.1
[2.5 – 3 [  4  360      
[3 – 3.5 [  5  589 3 157  26.7
[3.5 – 4 [  6  313      
[4 – 4.5 [  7  193 4 60  31.1
[4.5 – 5 [  8  48      
[5 – 5.5 [  9  19 5 12  63.2
   1849   322 
 
 
In our cardinal treatment of the CPIA we first estimate a model of the following form: 
 
,, 1 , , , '' it it it it i t it CPIA CPIA X Election β θϕτ ε − =+ + + + + ,               (1) 
 
where i (i = 1…N) denote countries and t (t = 1…T) denote years. Xi,t and Electioni,t are 
respectively a set of control and election variables. ϕi and τt are respectively country 
fixed effects and years dummies. 
 
The first way to estimate equation (1) is to use a Within estimator, which is 
asymptotically biased on finite T (Nickell, 1981; Sevestre and Trognon, 1985). However, 
our sample is large (more than 1,000 observations) and the average T is 23 years (the 
maximum being 27 years), suggesting that the bias plaguing the Within estimator is close 
to zero (Judson and Owen, 1999). The second way of estimating equation (1) is to 
transform the model in first-difference. OLS estimations of the first-difference 
transformation of equation (1) may still be biased because of the correlation between the lagged endogenous variable and the error term. An alternative is to use the application of 
the Generalized Method of Moments proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and to 
instrument ΔCPIAi,t-1 by its lagged values in level starting from t-2.   
 
One of our ordinal strategies is to estimate an ordered probit model of the following 
form: 
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The other ordinal strategy is to explain positive changes in the CPIA by means of a logit 
model of the following form: 
 





1   if  0







Δ> ⎧ ⎪ = ⎨ Δ≤ ⎪ ⎩
. 
 
Because equation (3) links the changes in the CPIA to level variables it may omit some 
important control variables. Changes in the CPIA may be more related to changes in Xi,t 
than to the level of Xi,t.  Equation (3) can therefore be augmented in the following way:   
 
,, , , , , '' ' it it it it it i t it Change CPIA X X Election β γθ ϕ τ ε =++ Δ + + + + ,                                (4) 
 
Of the three empirical strategies, we use the third one as our core analysis and test its 
robustness using the two other strategies. The choice of one strategy over the other 
crucially depends on how ordinal the CPIA is considered to be. The advantage of the 
third strategy is to respect the ordinal nature of the CPIA without making any strong 
econometric assumptions as to the ordinality / cardinality of the CPIA. 
 
Finally, the choice of the CPIA as our core dependent variable is crucial to our analysis, 
and as noted above is not without raising substantial conceptual and econometric issues. 
We therefore test the robustness of our baseline model using the ICRG (International 
Country Risk Guide). The ICRG is a rating of countries according to their economic and 
political environment, which reflects the feeling of private investors. The ICRG is an 
alternative measure of policy and institutions which gives more weigh than the CPIA to 
the quality of institutions (corruption, rule of law, quality of bureaucracy, etc.). As such, 
it is both an interesting robustness check and a good complement to our analysis using 
the CPIA.      
 
 3.2. Variables and Data 
 
Policy and institutions depend on a set of control variables, Xi,t, and on a set of variables 
relating to politics, Electioni,t.  Xi,t include conventional development indicators: the level 
of income and its square, population and education. It also includes more structural 
characteristics such as the share of the natural resource rents in GDP, and whether the 
country is at war. These variables and their sources are presented in detail in Appendix 2.  
 
Electioni,t is a set of variables relating to the timing of elections. Data on elections are 
from the Database on Political Institutions (DPI) of the World Bank. To test the 
robustness of our results, we also use the database on elections used by Brender and 
Drazen (2005) and provided by Allan Drazen. Since our analysis is based on annual 
observations elections that occur early in the year may be more appropriately assigned to 
the previous year. We discuss this issue more fully in Section 4. 
 
Knowing election years we construct four variables to precisely capture the 
characteristics of the electoral timing and test the cyclical and structural effects of 
elections raised in section 2. The first one, FREQUENCY of election, is the number of 
years between the current election and the previous election. We lag this variable because 
of its potential endogeneity with respect to the chances of reform. By lagging, we mean 
that if an election occurs in year t, FREQUENCY is equal to the number of years 
between election in year t and the previous election. This number is reported for each 
year of the mandate starting in year t.
3  
 
To construct FREQUENCY, the country obviously needs to have held at least two 
elections. FREQUENCY is therefore equal to 0 if the country never had an election as 
well as during the mandate following the first elections. To control for this characteristic 
of FREQUENCY, we construct two dummy variables: NEVER, which is equal to 1 for 
the period during which the country never had an election – knowing that we have 
information on elections since 1975 –, and FIRST which is equal to one during the first 
mandate.   
 
The fourth variable captures the political cycle. CYCLE is constructed as the number of 
years that separate year t from the nearest election, whether this is the previous election 
or the next election. So if an election occurs in years t and t+4, CYCLE is equal to 0 in 
both years t and t+4; it is equal to 1 in years t+1 and t+3 ; and it is equal to 2 in year t+2.  
 
Table 2 provides some summary statistics on the dependent variables, on Xi,t and on the 





                                                 
3 We also reconstruct FREQUENCY of elections using Drazen’s database. This further allows us to tackle 
the endogeneity issue of the timing of elections by distinguishing between predetermined and endogenous 
elections (see Section 5 on robustness checks). Table 2. Descriptive statistics, 1978-2004, 82 countries. 
Averages on the sample  Obs.  Mean  St. Devia.  Minimum  Maximum 
Dependent  CPIA 1849 3.13 0.78  1  5.5
 ICRG  1273 60.1 12.5  13  83.5
Electioni.t ELECTION  1849 0.17 0.37  0  1
 NEVER  1849 0.18 0.38  0 1
 FIRST  1849 0.20 0.40  0 1
 FREQUENCY  1849 3.19 2.99  0  19
 CYCLE  1849 0.86 1.23  0  11
 QUALITY  1849 3.31 3.05  0 7
Xi.t  Ln income p.c.. lagged  1849 7.98 0.86  5.14  9.82
  Income p.c. lagged  1849 4059 3205  171  18390
  Secondary education. lagged  1849 7.26 8.19  0.10  110.08
  Ln population. lagged  1849 16.13 1.65  11.76  20.98
  Population. Lagged (in thousands)  1849 49600 164000  127.8  1290000
  Natural resource rent. lagged  1849 5.94 9.01  0  74.78
 Dummy  AT  WAR  1849 0.11 0.32  0 1
Averages by countries           
Electioni.t  Average nb of elections   82 3.77 1.97  0  8
  Average nb of years before the 1
st election  82 4.00 6.58  0  27
  Average nb of years of the 1
st mandate  82 4.48 3.12  0  18
 Average  FREQUENCY 
(1) 82 3.37 1.49  0  8
 Average  CYCLE 
(1) 82 0.90 0.60  0  4.44
 Average  QUALITY 
(1) 82 3.54 2.06  0  7
(1): calculated on the period following the first mandate. Our sample of 1849 observations contains 82 
developing countries on a period from 1978 to 2004. When we use the ICRG, this sample is reduced to 
1273 observation on 70 countries on a period from 1985 to 2005. 
 
 
4. Estimation of the Baseline Model 
 
We now turn to our results. We investigate whether elections create pressures for better 
policies and governance on a sample of 82 developing countries on annual data from 
1978 to 2004. A priori no single statistical approach dominates and so we present results 
using four different ones. Similarly, there are two distinct data sets on policy and 
governance, two data sets on elections, and potentially three different options for 
assigning elections to calendar years. Since the number of possible permutations of these 
options is considerable we proceed by presenting first a ‘core’ regression and then 
progressively introducing alternatives. While not all permutations are presented, all have 
been investigated and we note in the text those which are significantly different. 
Complete results are available from the authors.   
 
In Table 3 we explore the factors that lead to a year-on-year improvement in the CPIA. 
We estimate Equations (3) and (4). Since the CPIA is not a cardinal variable, we analyze 
its change by creating a dummy variable which takes the value of unity if it has improved 
relative to the previous year and estimate the probability of improvement through a logit 
regression. Subsequently we investigate a cardinal treatment of the CPIA. Table 3. Logit estimations of the baseline model, 1978-2004, 82 countries. 
Dummy = 1 if ΔCPIA>0  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
        
Dummy ELECTION (datation 1)  -0.102  -0.091         
  (0.68)  (0.58)      
Dummy NEVER had an election      -0.978  -0.986  -0.847  -0.827 
      (2.98)*** (2.96)*** (2.02)**  (1.95)* 
Dummy FIRST election      -1.019  -1.026  -0.893  -0.872 
      (3.46)*** (3.47)*** (2.28)**  (2.19)** 
CYCLE      0.208 0.204 0.208 0.203 
     (2.01)**  (1.92)*  (2.01)**  (1.92)* 
CYCLE  squared      -0.040 -0.041 -0.040 -0.041 
      (3.68)*** (3.65)*** (3.70)*** (3.67)*** 
FREQUENCY of elections      -0.153  -0.155  -0.113  -0.106 
      (4.68)*** (4.70)*** (1.12)  (1.03) 
FREQUENCY  squared      -0.003  -0.003 
      (0.44)  (0.52) 
CPIA in  level, lagged  -1.402  -1.476 -1.466 -1.545 -1.469 -1.548 
  (8.11)*** (8.35)*** (8.55)*** (8.76)*** (8.47)*** (8.68)*** 
Ln income p.c., lagged  3.760  4.623  3.275  4.055  3.282  4.065 
  (1.63) (1.71)*  (1.43) (1.51) (1.44) (1.52) 
Ln income p.c. squared, lagged  -0.269 -0.328 -0.247 -0.300 -0.247 -0.300 
  (1.75)* (1.83)* (1.60)  (1.66)* (1.61)  (1.67)* 
Secondary education, lagged  -0.007 -0.003 -0.000 0.001  -0.001 -0.000 
  (0.66) (0.14) (0.01) (0.03) (0.06) (0.01) 
Ln population, lagged  -1.109  -0.962 -0.728 -0.583 -0.748 -0.605 
  (0.92) (0.83) (0.59) (0.49) (0.60) (0.50) 
Resource  rent,  lagged  0.031 0.028 0.031 0.028 0.031 0.028 
  (1.87)* (1.64)  (1.93)* (1.68)* (1.91)* (1.63) 
Dummy AT WAR  -0.784  -0.788  -0.758 -0.761 -0.757 -0.760 
  (3.21)*** (3.17)*** (2.93)*** (2.89)*** (2.93)*** (2.88)*** 
Δ Ln income p.c., lagged   -14.305   -15.079   -15.046 
   (2.64)***   (2.91)***   (2.92)*** 
Δ Ln income p.c. squared, lagged   1.088   1.136   1.134 
   (2.86)***   (3.03)***   (3.05)*** 
Δ Secondary education, lagged   -0.038   -0.002   -0.002 
   (0.20)   (0.01)   (0.01) 
Δ Ln population, lagged   6.095   7.037   7.111 
   (0.97)   (1.09)   (1.10) 
Δ Resource rent, lagged   0.003   0.002   0.003 
   (0.15)   (0.09)   (0.11) 
Constant  3.525 -1.531  6.505 -1.636  3.192 -1.782 
  (0.21) (0.09) (0.37) (0.09) (0.19) (0.10) 
Observations  1849 1849 1849 1849 1849 1849 
Countries  82 82 82 82 82 82 
Turning point in CYCLE (years)      2.6  2.5  2.6  2.5 
Income  threshold  (in  logarithm)  6.99 7.05 6.63 6.76 6.64 6.78 
Robust z statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for intra-country correlation. * significant at 
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:   Dummy = 1 when Δ CPIA is strictly positive. 
ESTIMATION METHOD:   Logit with country fixed effects and year dummies.  
DATING OF ELECTIONS:   The electoral dummy equals one in an election year and zero otherwise, 
no matter when during the year the election occurred. NEVER, FIRST, 
CYCLE and FREQUENCY are constructed according to this dating of 
elections. The first two columns provide baseline logit regressions with fixed effects and year 
dummies. Elections are introduced in the simplest possible form, namely a dummy 
variable which takes the value of unity if there is an election during the year. As with the 
other regressions in this table the election is assigned to the calendar year in which it 
occurs. The other explanatory variables are the CPIA, income and its square, secondary 
education, the size of the population, and the value of natural resource rents, all these 
variables being lagged. A dummy variable takes the value of unity if the country is at 
war. The regression in column (1) only the levels of these explanatory variables are 
included, whereas in (2) the changes in these variables are included along with their 
levels.  
 
In both regressions the dummy variable for elections is completely insignificant. 
Elections, the key institutional technology of democracy, appear to wash over the society 
without affecting economic policy. However, as we will show, this result is spurious and 
misleading.  It may compound offsetting cyclical and structural effects, or it may reflect 
endogeneity. The better is the CPIA the harder it is to improve it further, the result being 
highly significant in both regressions. Per capita income has non-linear effects that are 
borderline significant: reform is most likely at around $1150 per capita. Out of the 82 
countries in our sample, only 17 have a per capita income lower than this threshold, all 
but Nepal in Africa. Low income thus appears to be a stimulus to change. Somewhat 
surprisingly, natural resource rents have positive effects that are borderline significant. 
This may appear to run counter to the resource curse literature. However, that literature is 
concerned with the long term effects and the short term effects may be benign. 
Unsurprisingly, civil wars have a significantly negative impact on the probability that 
policy and institutions will improve. Annual time dummies (not reported) suggest that 
policies are getting better over time. While this may reflect nothing more than grade 
inflation on the part of World Bank staff, it is reasonable to expect that in countries which 
mostly only became independent during the 1960s governments would go through a 
gradual learning process.  
 
The regressions of columns 3 and 4 introduce the variables that are consistent with the 
discussion of theory in Section 2. Four new variables between them characterize 
elections. As discussed in Section 3, one is a dummy variable characterizing countries 
which up to the year being considered have never had an election during the period 1978-
2004. A second is a dummy variable for those observations in which there has been only 
one prior election in the country. The third variable – CYCLE – is the time in the 
electoral cycle as measured by the number of years that separate the year in question 
from the nearest election, whether this is the previous election or the next election. Note 
that this conflates two potentially distinct distances: forward-looking and backward-
looking. Thus, in this regression we treat the shortening horizon effect and the populist 
legacy effect as symmetrical. In subsequent analysis we test whether this conflation is 
warranted on the data. Both CYCLE and its square are included. As discussed in Section 
2, the effect of the time from the nearest election is unlikely to be monotonic. While in 
the vicinity of the election greater distance from it might improve policy, if the nearest 
election is very distant then the accountability of government to the electorate may be 
weakened. The final new variable – FREQUENCY – captures the frequency of elections. It is measured by the length of time between the most recent previous election and the 
one prior to that. Hence, the higher is the value of the variable the less frequent are 
elections.  
 
The control variables are the same as in the first two regressions. The regression of 
column (3) includes only the levels of these variables whereas that of column (4) also 
includes their changes. As previously, all these variables are lagged. The introduction of 
the new variables for elections does not significantly change the coefficients or 
significant levels of these control variables and so we focus on the election variables 
themselves. 
 
In contrast to the naïve approach of columns (1) and (2), all the elections variables are 
now significant. The inclusion of the changes in the control variables in addition to their 
levels makes virtually no difference to either coefficients or significance levels, nearly all 
of which are at one percent. What do the coefficients imply? 
 
The dummy for those countries which never held an election prior to the year under 
observation has a large negative coefficient. This is consistent with the hypothesis that 
elections introduce accountability, although the interpretation need not be causal. An 
alternative interpretation is that the absence of elections is a symptom of a more 
fundamental problem that prevents improvements in economic policy and governance 
rather than being its explanation. However, in addition to the control variables, recall that 
this regression includes fixed effects so that for all countries which did not have an 
election over the entire period 1978-2004 any effects of the absence of elections are 
subsumed in the fixed effect. Essentially, the variable NEVER is picking up the 
difference between periods prior to the first election and those subsequent to it: periods 
subsequent to elections are much more likely to have improvements in economic policy. 
The coefficient on observations in which the previous election was the first election is 
also large and negative, and statistically indistinguishable from that on the dummy for 
countries that never held elections. The most reasonable interpretation is that a single 
election is insufficient to change the behaviour of a government.  
 
The remaining three variables, CYCLE, its square, and FREQUENCY, exclude the first 
election. We start with FREQUENCY which is the structural relationship. Recall that the 
variable measures the number of years between the two previous elections. Hence, an 
increase in the variable is a reduction in the frequency of elections. The negative 
coefficient therefore implies that the more frequent are elections the more likely is the 
CPIA to improve. This is consistent with the accountability and legitimacy theory of 
democracy. As with the two dummy variables for countries which have never held 
elections or have only held one, the frequency of elections may itself proxy some 
characteristics not included in our control variables, but the deep and unchanging 
characteristics are all subsumed by means of fixed effects.  
 
Taken together with the negative and highly significant coefficients on the dummy 
variables, the negative and highly significant coefficient on FREQUENCY suggests that 
sustained elections really do have a structural effect on economic policy and governance, over the observed period increasing the chance of policy improvement and presumably in 
the long run improving the level of policy. Despite the reasons to fear that in developing 
countries governments might be able to win elections without regard to policy, 
democracy appears to work. 
 
We now turn to CYCLE and its square. Both are significant, and whereas if the squared 
term is excluded CYCLE itself loses significance. CYCLE is positive and its square is 
negative: what does this mean? Recall that CYCLE measures the time until the nearest 
election, either viewed back to the previous one or forward to the next. An important 
issue is going to be whether this conflation of effects is warranted on the data, but for the 
moment we will focus on what it implies if it is warranted. The positive coefficient on 
CYCLE implies that the further away is an election the better are the chances of policy 
reform. This indicates a tension between elections as important structural instruments of 
democracy and as periodic events which interrupt the normal business of government. 
Because both effects matter, any measure which conflates them is liable to be misleading. 
The negative coefficient on the square of CYCLE indicates that as the distance from an 
election increases at some point the benefits of further distance are exhausted and go into 
reverse. Since FREQUENCY is included, the periodicity of elections is already 
controlled for. However, it implies that if the periodicity is infrequent then the mid-term 
is not a good time for policy reform. This becomes clearest if elections are very 
infrequent, such as once-a-decade. In such a case it is indeed plausible that at the mid-
term the government would be less conscious of accountability to citizens.  
 
The socially optimal periodicity of elections implied by these results depends upon the 
three variables in combination. This is explored further in Section 7. However, here we 
pose a seemingly simple question: if elections increase accountability can elections be too 
frequent? As the periodicity is increased there are opposing effects. The direct effect of 
an increased value of FREQUENCY is adverse. However, a longer periodicity also 
changes the average composition of the years within each period: proportionately less 
time is very close to an election. Up to a point, this effect is benign. Hence, for the social 
optimum the net effect must be calculated and this is taken up in Section 7. 
 
The inclusion of the square of CYCLE but not the square of FREQUENCY may appear 
arbitrary. We first provide a degree of reassurance by adding the square of FREQUENCY 
in columns (5) and (6): the square is insignificant. There is indeed a good reason other 
than this result for the core regression to take the form of (3) and (4). Given that the 
structural and cyclical effects of elections are qualitatively offsetting, the minimum 
specification that can hope to capture optimality must include at least one squared term 
(or adopt some other function form which allows non-linearity). If, as appears to be the 
case, as periodicity is increased beyond a point the chances of reform in the mid-term 
period deteriorate, this can be captured better by including the square of CYCLE than the 
square of FREQUENCY. However, to include the square of both terms would build in 
redundancy. 
 
A fundamental aspect of the variable CYCLE is that it combines the backward and 
forward-looking effects of elections. In Tables 4 and 5 we investigate whether this is warranted. The conventional political economy analysis of elections is forward-looking: 
as the election approaches the government is less inclined to invest in policy reform 
because a higher proportion of the benefits will accrue after the election. If this is the 
only effect of elections on policy then an implication is that if analysis is based on annual 
observations those elections that occur in the first half of the year should be reassigned to 
the previous year. For example, almost all of the effects of an election held in January 
will be on policy decisions in the previous year. We now investigate whether such 
reassignment is superior to the strategy adopted in Table 3. In Table 4 we introduce 
dummy variables according to whether the election is in the first or second half of the 
year and interact them with the election variables. The key new variables are the 
interactions with CYCLE and its square. Evidently, since the cyclical effects are now 
spread over four variables instead of two, each pair with only around half as many 
observations, we might expect some loss of significance. However, the loss of 
significance is considerably more severe for the elections occurring in the first half of the 
year than in the second. This result suggests that the forward-looking effect of elections 
may be the only one of importance in which case the dating of elections should be 
changed accordingly. In Table 5 we therefore re-run the regressions of Table 3 but with 
the revised dating and compare it with Table 3. There is little to choose between the two 
sets of regressions. On the criterion of the p-values of the two cyclical variables judged 
on the two core regressions of columns (3) and (4) the original dating slightly 
outperforms: three of the four p-values are higher. On the criterion of the other election 
variables the preference for the original dating is a little stronger: in particular, the p-
values on the two election dummy variables drop considerably with when elections in the 
first half of the year are re-assigned to the previous year. Fortunately, the actual 
coefficients on the election variables are virtually unaltered. We therefore retain the 
calendar dating of elections, thereby implicitly giving legacy effects similar weight to 
anticipation effects. Quite possibly the anticipation effects are stronger than the legacy 
effects but not the entire story. Table 4. Baseline model, splitting the timing of elections, 1978-2004, 82 countries. 
Dummy = 1 if ΔCPIA>0  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dummy NEVER had an election      -1.159  -1.169  -0.970  -0.949 
      (3.44)*** (3.43)*** (2.21)**  (2.13)** 
Variables in interaction with a dummy FIRST HALF of the year 
Dummy ELECTION   0.044  0.068      
  (0.21)  (0.32)      
Dummy  FIRST  election      -0.868 -0.871 -0.691 -0.665 
      (2.85)*** (2.87)*** (1.64)  (1.56) 
CYCLE      -0.008 -0.036 0.021  -0.008 
      (0.03) (0.16) (0.09) (0.03) 
CYCLE  squared      0.073 0.075 0.067 0.069 
      (0.95) (1.01) (0.89) (0.95) 
FREQUENCY  of  elections      -0.149 -0.150 -0.114 -0.105 
      (4.16)*** (4.13)*** (1.12)  (1.00) 
FREQUENCY  squared      -0.001  -0.002 
      (0.25)  (0.34) 
Variables in interaction with a dummy SECOND HALF of the year 
Dummy  ELECTION    -0.250  -0.252      
  (1.09)  (1.06)      
Dummy  FIRST  election      -1.506 -1.522 -1.315 -1.297 
      (4.05)*** (4.03)*** (2.79)*** (2.67)*** 
CYCLE      0.143 0.154 0.128 0.139 
      (1.01) (1.06) (0.87) (0.92) 
CYCLE  squared      -0.038 -0.041 -0.037 -0.039 
      (2.69)*** (2.83)*** (2.52)**  (2.66)*** 
FREQUENCY  of  elections      -0.206 -0.211 -0.120 -0.113 
      (4.25)*** (4.33)*** (0.83)  (0.77) 
FREQUENCY  squared      -0.008  -0.009 
      (0.70)  (0.76) 
CPIA in level, lagged  -1.402  -1.477 -1.489 -1.564 -1.491 -1.566 
  (8.09)*** (8.33)*** (8.66)*** (8.88)*** (8.63)*** (8.84)*** 
Ln income p.c., lagged  3.774  4.650  3.002  3.862  2.962  3.800 
  (1.65)*  (1.73)*  (1.31) (1.44) (1.31) (1.43) 
Ln income p.c. squared, lagged  -0.270 -0.331 -0.228 -0.287 -0.226 -0.284 
  (1.77)*  (1.84)*  (1.48) (1.58) (1.48) (1.58) 
Secondary education, lagged  -0.006  -0.003  0.000  0.004  -0.001  0.002 
  (0.63) (0.13) (0.05) (0.17) (0.06) (0.10) 
Ln population, lagged  -1.126  -0.985 -0.764 -0.627 -0.836 -0.702 
  (0.93) (0.84) (0.61) (0.52) (0.65) (0.57) 
Resource  rent,  lagged  0.032 0.028 0.035 0.032 0.034 0.032 
  (1.87)*  (1.65)*  (2.22)** (2.01)** (2.19)** (1.95)* 
Dummy AT WAR  -0.792  -0.798  -0.772 -0.779 -0.775 -0.779 
  (3.22)*** (3.19)*** (2.89)*** (2.90)*** (2.90)*** (2.90)*** 
Δ Ln income p.c., lagged   -14.576   -14.972   -14.569 
   (2.74)***   (2.87)***   (2.84)*** 
Δ Ln income p.c. squared, lagged   1.107   1.124   1.100 
   (2.96)***   (2.99)***   (2.97)*** 
Δ Secondary education, lagged   -0.037   -0.031   -0.027 
   (0.19)   (0.16)   (0.14) 
Δ Ln population, lagged   6.098   7.164   7.453 
   (0.97)   (1.06)   (1.08) 
Δ Resource rent, lagged   0.003   0.002   0.003 
   (0.14)   (0.07)   (0.12) 
Observations (countries)  1849 (82)  1849 (82)  1849 (82)  1849 (82)  1849 (82)  1849 (82) 
Robust z statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for intra-country correlation. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 
5%; *** significant at 1%. DEPENDENT VARIABLE: Dummy = 1 when ΔCPIA is strictly positive. ESTIMATION METHOD: 
Logit with country fixed effects and year dummies, constant included but not shown. DATING OF ELECTIONS: The electoral 
dummy equals one in an election year and zero otherwise, no matter when during the year the election occurred. NEVER, FIRST, 
CYCLE and FREQUENCY are constructed according to this dating of elections. The dummies FIRST and SECOND half of the 
year are equal to one if the elections were held, respectively, before and after June. This dummy is equal to one during the whole 
duration of the mandate.   Table 5. Baseline model, alternative dating of elections, 1978-2004, 82 countries. 
Dummy = 1 if ΔCPIA>0  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
         
Dummy ELECTION (datation 2)  -0.246  -0.244         
  (1.53)  (1.48)      
Dummy NEVER had an election      -0.674  -0.663  -0.422  -0.391 
      (2.07)** (2.03)** (1.09)  (1.01) 
Dummy FIRST election      -0.725  -0.719  -0.479  -0.451 
      (2.47)** (2.46)** (1.33)  (1.24) 
CYCLE      0.217 0.221 0.216 0.220 
      (1.98)** (1.99)** (1.97)** (1.97)** 
CYCLE  squared      -0.039 -0.040 -0.039 -0.040 
      (3.12)*** (3.16)*** (3.14)*** (3.17)*** 
FREQUENCY of elections      -0.141  -0.142  -0.059  -0.053 
      (4.97)*** (4.95)*** (0.75)  (0.64) 
FREQUENCY  squared      -0.005  -0.006 
       (1.21)  (1.29) 
CPIA, lagged  -1.401  -1.475  -1.444 -1.522 -1.450 -1.529 
  (8.09)***  (8.34)*** (8.68)*** (8.92)*** (8.59)*** (8.83)*** 
Ln income p.c., lagged  3.728  4.610  3.434  4.259  3.493  4.323 
  (1.63)  (1.71)*  (1.51) (1.60) (1.56) (1.65)* 
Ln income p.c. squared, lagged  -0.267 -0.328  -0.255  -0.312 -0.259 -0.315 
  (1.74)*  (1.83)* (1.66)* (1.73)* (1.70)* (1.78)* 
Secondary education, lagged  -0.008  -0.004 -0.002 -0.000 -0.003 -0.002 
  (0.73)  (0.18) (0.24) (0.00) (0.34) (0.08) 
Ln population, lagged  -1.143  -1.003 -0.913 -0.782 -0.963 -0.832 
  (0.94)  (0.86) (0.76) (0.67) (0.79) (0.70) 
Resource  rent  updated,  lagged  0.032  0.029 0.033 0.030 0.032 0.029 
  (1.89)*  (1.66)* (2.07)**  (1.83)* (2.02)**  (1.74)* 
Dummy AT WAR  -0.790  -0.795  -0.750 -0.756 -0.748 -0.752 
  (3.22)***  (3.19)*** (2.90)*** (2.88)*** (2.89)*** (2.86)*** 
Δ Ln income p.c., lagged    -14.553   -14.999   -14.933 
    (2.74)***   (2.94)***   (2.95)*** 
Δ Ln income p.c. squared, lagged    1.103   1.134   1.130 
    (2.95)***   (3.08)***   (3.10)*** 
Δ Secondary education , lag    -0.039   -0.021   -0.016 
    (0.20)   (0.11)   (0.08) 
Δ Ln population, lagged    6.164   6.859   6.964 
    (0.98)   (1.06)   (1.08) 
Δ Resource rent, lagged    0.003   0.002   0.003 
    (0.14)   (0.08)   (0.12) 
Constant  4.023  -0.828  7.750 2.201 4.175 -0.617 
  (0.24)  (0.05) (0.46) (0.12) (0.26) (0.04) 
Observations  1849  1849 1849 1849 1849 1849 
Countries    82  82 82 82 82 82 
Turning point in CYCLE (years)      2.8  2.8  2.8  2.8 
Robust z statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for intra-country correlation. * significant at 
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:   Dummy = 1 when Δ CPIA is strictly positive. 
ESTIMATION METHOD:   Logit with country fixed effects and year dummies.  
SECOND DATING:   The  electoral dummy equals one in an election year if the election 
occurs after June and in the year before the election year it the election 
occurs before June. It is equal to zero otherwise. NEVER, FIRST, 
CYCLE and FREQUENCY are constructed according to this dating of 
elections.  Section 5. Robustness Checks 
 
In this section, we provide a set of robustness checks of our baseline model. The CPIA 
has often been contested and the first robustness check is therefore to estimate the 
baseline model using the ICRG as an alternative measure of policy and institutions. 
Moreover, the chosen empirical strategy potentially loses information by treating the 
CPIA as ordinal. Our second set of robustness checks therefore explores alternative 
estimation methods using equations (1) and (2). A third set of robustness checks provides 
estimations of our baseline model using Allan Drazen’s database of elections. Using this 
dataset also allows to explore the potential endogeneity issue of our elections variables by 
distinguishing between constitutionally predetermined elections and endogenous 
elections. Finally, our fourth set of robustness checks focuses more specifically on the 
CYCLE variable and proposes alternative ways of measuring political cycles.  
 
 
5.1. Estimations using the ICRG 
 
Our first variant on these core results is to switch from the CPIA as a measure of policy 
improvement to the ICRG rating. Recall that the ICRG is a commercial rating and so is 
subject to the discipline of the market. However, it covers fewer countries that the World 
Bank rating and only a period starting in 1985.
4 Further, as the recent travails of the credit 
rating agencies indicate, the discipline of the market may in practice produce worse 
quality than that of an impartial public bureaucracy. 
 
Table 6 reproduces the regressions of Table 3 with the dependent variable being a 
dummy which is equal to one when changes in the ICRG are positive. Among the control 
variables, it agrees with the World Bank data in finding that there has been an 
improvement in policy year-by-year that is unrelated to the other explanatory variables 
(the time dummies are not shown in the Table). Hence, our former result is unlikely to be 
fully explained by grade inflation among World Bank staff. The result is important 
because it severs the secular improvement in policy from the spread of democracy. 
 
As to our election variables, it finds the same cyclical and structural effects as using the 
CPIA data. Although CYCLE is not individually significant its square is and so the two 
variables should be assessed in terms of their joint significance. The last row of Table 6 
reports that CYCLE and its square are jointly significant at 5%.  
 
                                                 
4 Three countries are in the ICRG database but not in the CPIA one: Barhain, Iran and Iraq. We ran the 
estimations with and without these countries and it did not change our results. Moreover, the ICRG is 
available for more recent years than the CPIA. Therefore Table 6 covers 2005, while Table 3 stopped in 
2004. Table 6. Robustness checks using ICRG, 1985-2005, 70 countries. 
Dummy = 1 if ΔICRG>0  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
        
Dummy  ELECTION  0.013  0.009      
  (0.07)  (0.05)      
Dummy NEVER had an election      -0.867  -0.939  -1.905  -1.905 
     (1.09)  (1.15)  (2.00)**  (1.93)* 
Dummy FIRST election      -0.331  -0.419  -1.319  -1.338 
     (0.63)  (0.81)  (1.81)*  (1.81)* 
CYCLE      0.083 0.087 0.074 0.078 
      (0.68) (0.68) (0.61) (0.62) 
CYCLE  squared      -0.029 -0.026 -0.027 -0.024 
     (2.04)**  (1.82)*  (1.95)*  (1.70)* 
FREQUENCY of elections      -0.019  -0.027  -0.337  -0.323 
     (0.34)  (0.45)  (2.01)**  (2.00)** 
FREQUENCY  squared      0.021  0.020 
      (2.08)**  (2.12)** 
ICRG in level, lagged  -0.125  -0.141 -0.130 -0.146 -0.129 -0.144 
  (6.93)*** (7.42)*** (7.32)*** (7.83)*** (7.21)*** (7.74)*** 
Ln income p.c., lagged  0.951  0.791  0.471  0.440  0.733  0.611 
  (0.21) (0.22) (0.11) (0.12) (0.17) (0.17) 
Ln income p.c. squared, lagged  -0.033  -0.028  0.002  -0.001  -0.016  -0.015 
  (0.11) (0.12) (0.01) (0.01) (0.06) (0.06) 
Secondary  education,  lagged  -0.002  0.008 0.007 0.019 0.023 0.033 
  (0.06) (0.20) (0.17) (0.46) (0.55) (0.79) 
Ln population, lagged  -0.165  -0.624  0.289 -0.093  0.324 -0.097 
  (0.10) (0.39) (0.18) (0.06) (0.20) (0.06) 
Resource  rent,  lagged  0.026 0.025 0.021 0.020 0.021 0.020 
  (0.80) (0.86) (0.72) (0.75) (0.72) (0.76) 
Dummy AT WAR  -1.039  -0.894  -1.021 -0.877 -1.041 -0.895 
  (2.56)** (1.97)** (2.59)***  (1.99)** (2.69)***  (2.06)** 
Δ. Ln income p.c., lagged   10.492   9.946   9.708 
   (1.11)   (1.06)   (1.01) 
Δ. Ln income p.c. squared, lagged   -0.297   -0.270   -0.249 
   (0.49)   (0.45)   (0.40) 
Δ. Secondary education, lagged   0.128   0.135   0.109 
   (0.47)   (0.51)   (0.42) 
Δ. Ln population, lagged   21.013   21.138   20.664 
   (3.00)***   (3.17)***   (3.19)*** 
Δ. Resource rent, lagged   0.046   0.049   0.048 
   (1.60)   (1.73)*   (1.70)* 
Constant  5.244 12.929  1.733 7.951 1.065 8.231 
  (0.26) (0.58) (0.09) (0.35) (0.05) (0.37) 
Observations  1273 1273 1273 1273 1273 1273 
Countries  70 70 70 70 70 70 
Turning point in CYCLE (years)      1.4  1.7  1.4  1.6 
Joint significance of CYCLE and its square (p-value)  0.019 0.033 0.025 0.049 
Robust z statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for intra-country correlation. * significant at 
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:   Dummy = 1 when Δ ICRG is strictly positive. 
ESTIMATION METHOD:   Logit with country fixed effects and year dummies.  
DATING OF ELECTIONS:   The electoral dummy equals one in an election year and zero otherwise, 
no matter when during the year the election occurred. NEVER, FIRST, 
CYCLE and FREQUENCY are constructed according to this dating of 
elections. The ICRG gives more weight to institutions – rule of law, corruption, quality of 
bureaucracy, etc. – than the CPIA which is primarily focused on economic policy and 
structural economic reforms. A minor difference between Tables 3 and 6 is that 
FREQUENCY only becomes significantly negative once its square is introduced. 
Although the squared term is positive, within the relevant range of the data it almost 
never predominates.  The turning point is in excess of 8 years which is found only in 
Liberia, Sierra Leone and Togo. The results are thus consistent with those of Table 3.  
 
Finally, NEVER and FIRST have the same negative coefficient as in Table 3, but are less 
robustly significant.  
 
 
5.2. Robustness of the estimation method: estimation of equations (1) and (2) 
 
We next turn to robustness checks of the estimation method. More specifically, Table 7 
presents the estimations of Equation (1) – assuming continuous CPIA – using three 
different estimation methods: within estimator, OLS on first-difference, and Arellano and 
Bond (1991) GMM estimator. It also presents the estimations of Equation (2) – assuming 
ordered CPIA – using an ordered probit model.   
 
These results are presented in Table 7. The most striking result is the robustness of the 
CYCLE effect. In Table 7, the turning point is relatively stable, between 1.7 and 2.3, and 
close to that of Table 3. The coefficients on FREQUENCY, NEVER and FIRST are all 
always negative, as in Table 3, but they are each only significant in two of the 
regressions. Among the control variables, although the square of income is only 
significant in four of the regressions, it is always negative, as in Table 3. 
 
    Table 7. Robustness checks of the estimation method, 1978-2004, 82 countries. 
Estimation method  WITHIN  FIRST-DIFFERENCE  A&B GMM  ORDERED PROBIT 
  (1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dummy NEVER had an election  -0.093  -0.144 -0.083  -0.095 -0.028 -0.075 -0.126 -0.331 
  (2.08)**  (2.27)**  (1.01)  (0.74) (0.26) (0.42) (0.71) (1.38) 
Dummy FIRST election  -0.075  -0.125  -0.080 -0.092  -0.031  -0.078 -0.080 -0.278 
  (1.77)*  (2.09)**  (1.19)  (0.78) (0.34) (0.47) (0.50) (1.29) 
CYCLE  0.027  0.027 0.034  0.034 0.030 0.030 0.094 0.092 
  (1.97)*  (1.98)* (2.24)**  (2.24)**  (1.68)* (1.68)* (1.71)* (1.68)* 
CYCLE squared  -0.006  -0.006  -0.010  -0.009 -0.007 -0.007 -0.021 -0.020 
  (4.12)***  (4.17)***  (2.58)**  (2.57)** (1.97)** (1.96)** (2.19)** (2.17)** 
FREQUENCY of elections  -0.010  -0.025  -0.013 -0.017  -0.008  -0.023 -0.029 -0.091 
  (1.74)*  (1.49) (1.44)  (0.54) (0.67) (0.55) (1.45) (1.66)* 
FREQUENCY  squared    0.001   0.000   0.001   0.004 
    (0.98)   (0.15)   (0.42)   (1.32) 
CPIA,  lagged  0.726  0.727 -0.049  -0.049  0.606 0.605 2.260 2.264 
  (36.73)***  (36.89)*** (1.71)*  (1.71)*  (11.49)*** (11.48)*** (19.46)*** (19.57)*** 
Ln  income  p.c.,  lagged  0.616  0.612 0.428  0.428 2.425 2.440 1.049 1.052 
  (1.86)*  (1.85)*  (0.63)  (0.63)  (2.65)*** (2.68)*** (0.88)  (0.88) 
Ln income p.c. squared, lagged  -0.048  -0.048 -0.020  -0.020 -0.193 -0.194 -0.091 -0.091 
  (2.08)**  (2.07)**  (0.42)  (0.42)  (3.05)*** (3.08)*** (1.12)  (1.12) 
Secondary  education,  lag  0.002  0.002 0.006  0.006 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.005 
  (1.81)*  (1.95)*  (0.91)  (0.91) (0.43) (0.47) (1.09) (1.27) 
Ln population, lagged  -0.118  -0.112  -0.470 -0.468  -0.351  -0.344 -0.763 -0.740 
  (0.77)  (0.73) (0.76)  (0.76) (0.59) (0.58) (1.60) (1.56) 
Resource rent, lagged  -0.000  -0.000  0.004  0.004  0.006  0.006  -0.008  -0.008 
  (0.14)  (0.13) (1.35)  (1.34) (1.57) (1.57) (1.22) (1.20) 
Dummy AT WAR  -0.119  -0.120  -0.096  -0.096 -0.052 -0.054 -0.283 -0.285 
  (2.94)***  (2.97)***  (1.60)  (1.60) (0.73) (0.75) (1.90)*  (1.91)* 
Constant  1.205  1.171  0.045  0.045      
  (0.45)  (0.44)  (3.14)***  (3.12)***      
Observations (countries)  1849 (82)  1849 (82)  1771 (82)  1771 (2)  1771 (82)  1771 (82)  1849 (82)  1849 (82) 
Turning  point  in  CYCLE  (years)  2.3  2.3 1.7  1.9 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.3 
AR(1) [AR(2)] p-values          0.00  [0.23]  0.00  [0.23]     
Hansen test p-value [nb of instruments]          1.00 [97]  1.00 [97]     
Robust z statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for intra-country correlation. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Columns (1) and (2):  Within estimations of equation (1); dependent variable is continuous CPIA; estimations include year dummies. 
Columns (3) and (4):  Estimations in first-difference of equation (1); dependent variable is continuous ΔCPIA; estimations include year dummies.  
Columns (5) and (6):  Arellano and Bond GMM estimation of equation (1) transformed in first-difference; dependent variable is continuous ΔCPIA; estimations include 
year   dummies; two-step estimator, using levels of CPIA from t-2 to t-4 as instruments for ΔCPIAi,t-1.  
Columns (7) and (8):  Estimation of ordered probit; the CPIA is ordered from 1 to 9 every 0.5 increment in the CPIA: estimations include year and country dummies.  
Dating of elections:   The electoral dummy equals one in an election year and zero otherwise, no matter when during the year the election occurred. NEVER, FIRST, 
CYCLE and FREQUENCY are constructed according to this dating of elections.   
5.3. Predetermined versus endogenous elections 
 
Our third set of robustness checks of the core results is to switch from the DPI data on 
elections to that used by Brender and Drazen (2005) and provided by Allan Drazen on his 
website. The switch to Drazen’s data considerably shrinks the sample (see Appendix 3), 
however, it has one key advantage. Drazen distinguishes between those elections which 
were the result of a constitutionally mandated period between elections and those which 
were not. The former can be regarded as predetermined events whereas the latter are 
potentially far more seriously contaminated by endogeneity than the lagged elections 
used in our core analysis.  The Drazen data thus enable us to test whether our core results 
are likely to be spurious. We first briefly discuss the results for all elections and then 
distinguish between predetermined and endogenous elections focusing upon the former. 
 
Table 8 reproduces our core regression using Drazen’s database. It reproduces the 
significant cyclical effects but the effects of FREQUENCY are not as robust. NEVER 
and FIRST still have negative coefficients in all columns but are not significant.  
 
Within the set of all elections some can be considered as predetermined and other as 
potentially endogenous. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 9 distinguish between the two. 
Predetermined elections are those which are held within the expected year of the 
constitutionally fixed term (Brender and Drazen, 2005). Although there is a striking 
difference between the results for the exogenous and potentially endogenous elections, it 
is not troubling for our core results. The exogenous elections have results very similar to 
those of our core regressions. CYCLE is significantly positive, its square is significantly 
negative, and FREQUENCY or its square are negative and either significant or nearly so. 
It is the potentially endogenous elections which fail to generate significant results. This 
suggests that our core results are not the spurious consequence of endogeneity. 
 
In columns (3) and (4) of Table 9, we turn back to using the DPI database and provide an 
alternative test of the distinction between predetermined and potentially endogenous 
elections. Unfortunately, the DPI database does not provide this kind of distinction. 
However, we can account for the regularity of elections. Regularly held elections are 
more likely to be predetermined than endogenous. We therefore construct a dummy 
REGULAR, which is equal to one for the countries which have had the same 
FREQUENCY of elections during the whole period following the first mandate. We then 
multiply this dummy with CYCLE and FREQUENCY. The interaction terms do not alter 
the results for CYCLE. The number of years away from elections which maximises the 
chances of policy change is 2.7, close to the results of Table 3. In column (3), which 
replicates the form of our core regressions, the interaction terms are never significant, 
suggesting that the potential endogeneity of some elections is not an important issue in 
the regression. In column (4), where we introduce the square of FREQUENCY, its 
interaction with the dummy for regular elections is borderline significant and negative, 
suggesting that endogeneity may perhaps be weakening the adverse effects of infrequent 
elections  
 Table 8. Robustness checks using Drazen’s database, 1978-2001, 39 countries 
Dummy = 1 if ΔCPIA>0  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
      
Dummy NEVER had an election  -0.887  -0.354  -0.641  -0.124 
  (1.13) (0.41) (0.91) (0.16) 
Dummy  FIRST  election  -0.820 -0.336 -0.894 -0.427 
 (1.84)*  (0.57)  (2.12)**  (0.75) 
CYCLE  0.296 0.296 0.291 0.291 
  (2.32)** (2.33)** (2.30)** (2.30)** 
CYCLE  squared  -0.044 -0.044 -0.045 -0.045 
  (2.66)*** (2.63)*** (2.61)*** (2.57)** 
FREQUENCY of elections  -0.060  0.104  -0.060  0.099 
  (1.76)* (0.72)  (1.81)* (0.69) 
FREQUENCY  squared   -0.006   -0.006 
   (1.27)   (1.24) 
CPIA,  lagged  -1.997 -2.042 -1.976 -2.019 
  (7.20)*** (7.32)*** (7.05)*** (7.15)*** 
Ln income p.c., lagged  -12.606  -12.437  -10.113  -9.897 
  (1.26) (1.27) (1.11) (1.10) 
Ln income p.c. squared, lagged  0.640  0.635  0.495  0.487 
  (1.07) (1.08) (0.90) (0.90) 
Secondary  education,  lagged  -0.015 -0.029 -0.002 -0.014 
  (0.24) (0.44) (0.03) (0.23) 
Ln population, lagged  -6.426 -6.441 -5.245 -5.239 
  (2.00)** (2.06)** (2.12)** (2.17)** 
Resource  rent,  lagged  -0.008 -0.010 -0.004 -0.007 
  (0.26) (0.37) (0.15) (0.24) 
Dummy  AT  WAR  -0.909 -0.978 -0.956 -1.023 
  (1.90)*  (1.97)** (2.01)** (2.09)** 
Δ Ln income p.c., lagged  19.294 18.905 15.676 15.278 
  (0.97) (0.95) (0.85) (0.83) 
Δ Ln income p.c. squared, lagged  -0.845 -0.828 -0.622 -0.605 
  (0.72) (0.71) (0.57) (0.56) 
Δ Secondary education, lagged  0.609 0.646 0.542 0.575 
 (1.68)*  (1.73)*  (1.50)  (1.55) 
Δ Ln population, lagged  37.357 32.709 31.387 26.702 
  (0.71) (0.60) (0.62) (0.50) 
Δ Resource rent, lagged  -0.015 -0.012 -0.015 -0.012 
  (0.30) (0.24) (0.31) (0.25) 
Constant  156.388 155.092 128.638 124.969 
  (2.14)** (2.17)** (2.23)** (2.20)** 
      
Observations  772   772   782   782  
Countries  39 39 39 39 
Turning  point  in  CYCLE  (years)  3.4 3.4 3.2 3.2 
Robust z statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for intra-country correlation. * significant at 
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. DEPENDENT VARIABLE: Dummy = 1 when Δ CPIA 
is strictly positive. ESTIMATION METHOD: Logit with country fixed effects and year dummies.   
ELECTION VARIABLES: From Drazen’s database. Columns (1) and (2) restrict the sample to countries 
included in estimations using DPI database. Columns (3) and (4) are not restricted to a sub-set of our main 
database which uses DPI; this leads to adding information on more years for three countries (Hungary, 
Romania and Poland). DATING OF ELECTIONS: The electoral dummy equals one in an election year and 
zero otherwise, no matter when during the year the election occurred. NEVER, FIRST, CYCLE and 
FREQUENCY are constructed according to this dating of elections.  Table 9. Logit estimations of the baseline model, 1978-2001/2004, 39/82 countries. 
Dummy = 1 if ΔCPIA>0  DRAZEN DPI 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) 
       
Dummy NEVER had an election  -0.643  0.703  -0.822  -0.641 
 (0.74)  (0.64)  (2.04)**  (1.37) 
Dummy FIRST election  -0.604  0.638  -0.905  -0.711 
 (1.36)  (0.95)  (2.82)***  (1.71)* 
Predetermined CYCLE  0.387  0.360     
 (2.50)**  (2.30)**     
Predetermined CYCLE squared  -0.057  -0.050     
 (2.14)**  (1.83)*     
Predetermined FREQUENCY of elections  -0.053  0.289     
 (1.52)  (1.79)*     
Predetermined FREQUENCY squared    -0.012     
   (2.26)**     
Endogenous CYCLE  0.116  0.156     
 (0.45)  (0.61)     
Endogenous CYCLE squared  -0.026  -0.031     
 (1.08)  (1.25)     
Endogenous FREQUENCY of elections  0.116  1.132     
 (0.82)  (2.15)**     
Endogenous FREQUENCY squared    -0.159     
   (1.60)     
CYCLE     0.235  0.239 
     (2.10)**  (2.13)** 
CYCLE squared      -0.043  -0.044 
     (3.79)***  (3.86)*** 
FREQUENCY of elections      -0.153  -0.098 
     (4.63)***  (0.94) 
FREQUENCY  squared      -0.003 
      ( 0 . 5 4 )  
REGULAR x CYCLE       -0.183  -0.205 
     (0.54)  (0.60) 
REGULAR x CYCLE squared      0.012  0.017 
     (0.22)  (0.32) 
REGULAR x FREQUENCY of elections      0.094  0.895 
     (0.98)  (2.16)** 
REGULAR x FREQUENCY squared        -0.165 
      ( 1 . 8 7 ) *  
CPIA,  lagged  -2.028  -2.089 -1.554 -1.563 
  (7.15)***  (7.07)*** (8.55)*** (8.46)*** 
Ln income p.c., lagged  -11.989  -15.557  4.097  4.066 
  (1.20)  (1.50) (1.41) (1.42) 
Ln income p.c. squared, lagged  0.603  0.815  -0.305  -0.300 
  (1.01)  (1.32) (1.56) (1.55) 
Secondary education, lagged  -0.002  -0.024  0.001  0.000 
  (0.02)  (0.37) (0.04) (0.01) 
Ln population, lagged  -6.326  -6.528 -0.662 -0.636 
 (1.95)*  (2.04)**  (0.55)  (0.52) 
Resource rent, lagged  -0.002  -0.007  0.028  0.027 
 (0.06)  (0.26)  (1.68)*  (1.57) 
Dummy  AT  WAR  -0.973  -1.001 -0.767 -0.772 
 (2.02)**  (2.02)**  (2.89)***  (2.90)*** 
 Table 9. Continued.  
Δ Ln income p.c., lagged  19.824 21.027  -15.053  -14.739 
 (1.01)  (1.09)  (2.90)***  (2.83)*** 
Δ Ln income p.c. squared, lagged  -0.880 -0.958  1.136  1.114 
 (0.75)  (0.84)  (3.03)***  (2.97)*** 
Δ Secondary education, lagged  0.614 0.606  -0.009  -0.009 
 (1.70)*  (1.70)*  (0.05)  (0.05) 
Δ Ln population, lagged  38.473 39.895  7.115  7.048 
 (0.74)  (0.74)  (1.12)  (1.10) 
Δ Resource rent, lagged  -0.017 -0.017  0.001  0.002 
 (0.34)  (0.34)  (0.05)  (0.10) 
Constant 152.100  174.355  -0.858  -1.350 
 (2.06)**  (2.26)**  (0.05)  (0.07) 
Observations (countries)   772 (39)  772 (39)  1849 (82)  1849 (82) 
Robust z statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for intra-country correlation. * significant at 
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. DEPENDENT VARIABLE: Dummy = 1 when Δ CPIA 
is strictly positive. ESTIMATION METHOD: Logit with country fixed effects and year dummies. 
DATING OF ELECTIONS: The electoral dummy equals one in an election year and zero otherwise, no 
matter when during the year the election occurred. NEVER, FIRST, CYCLE and FREQUENCY are 
constructed according to this dating of elections.  
 5.5. Alternative measures of CYCLE 
 
Finally our last set of robustness checks focuses on CYCLE. In the way we construct 
CYCLE, we implicitly assume some symmetry between the backward and forward-
looking effects of elections discussed in Section 2. CYCLE is a mix of two variables: the 
time since the last election and the time to the next election. In the first column of Table 
10 we reproduce the estimation of our baseline model. In columns (2) and (3), while 
retaining the composite CYCLE variable and its square, we add one of the two 
components, namely the number of years since the last election and its square. By 
introducing one of the two, we allow for some asymmetry in the treatment of these two 
components of CYCLE. If the two components had very different effects we would 
expect this to be revealed by significant coefficients on the added variable, positive or 
negative according to which component was key. In fact, adding these two variables does 
not alter the CYCLE result, nor the optimal year for policy change (around 2.8 years), 
and the added variables are insignificant.   
 
Finally, in column (4), we disaggregate CYCLE into four dummy variables. The first one 
is equal to one in the year following and in the year preceding an election. The second 
dummy is equal to one in the second years following and preceding an election. Because 
the average FREQUENCY of elections in our sample is lower than 4 years, we create 
four dummies of this kind. However, adding more of them does not alter the results of 
column (4). The coefficients of these four variables gradually increase up to the third 
dummy and start decreasing for the fourth one. Consistently with our previous results, 
three years away from elections seems to be the best timing for policy improvement. 
However, this set of dummies is not significant. Only the third one is close to 





 Table 10. Robustness to alternative measures of CYCLE, 1978-2004, 82 countries. 
Dummy = 1 if ΔCPIA>0  (1) (2)  (3)  (4) 
Dummy NEVER had an election  -0.986  -0.991  -0.988  -0.960 
 (2.96)***  (2.96)***  (2.94)***  (2.83)*** 
Dummy FIRST election  -1.026  -1.038  -1.035  -0.982 
 (3.47)***  (3.46)***  (3.42)***  (3.30)*** 
FREQUENCY of elections  -0.155  -0.156  -0.157  -0.155 
 (4.70)***  (4.67)***  (4.67)***  (4.55)*** 
CYCLE 0.204  0.243  0.231   
 (1.92)*  (2.14)**  (1.84)*   
CYCLE squared  -0.041  -0.043  -0.042   
 (3.65)***  (3.75)***  (3.64)***   
Number of years since last election    -0.029  -0.016   
   (0.71)  (0.18)   
Number of years since last election, squared      -0.001   
     (0.25)   
One year away from past and next election        0.193 
       (1.02) 
Two years away from past and next election        0.252 
       (1.36) 
Three years away from past and next election        0.607 
   ( p-value=0.114) (1.58) 
Four years away from past and next election        0.295 
       (0.84) 
CPIA, lagged  -1.545  -1.540  -1.540  -1.525 
 (8.76)***  (8.76)***  (8.75)***  (8.87)*** 
Ln income p.c., lagged  4.055  3.624  3.527  4.324 
 (1.51)  (1.22)  (1.19)  (1.68)* 
Ln income p.c. squared, lagged  -0.300  -0.274  -0.269  -0.316 
 (1.66)*  (1.40)  (1.38)  (1.80)* 
Secondary education, lagged  0.001  0.000  0.001  0.001 
 (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
Ln population, lagged  -0.583 -0.532  -0.506  -0.712 
 (0.49)  (0.45)  (0.42)  (0.61) 
Resource rent, lagged  0.028  0.028  0.028  0.029 
 (1.68)*  (1.62)  (1.61)  (1.78)* 
Dummy AT WAR  -0.761  -0.749  -0.746  -0.784 
 (2.89)***  (2.88)***  (2.84)***  (3.02)*** 
Δ Ln income p.c., lagged  -15.079 -15.086  -14.982  -13.550 
 (2.91)***  (2.87)***  (2.80)***  (2.61)*** 
Δ Ln income p.c. squared, lagged  1.136 1.137  1.131  1.036 
 (3.03)***  (3.00)***  (2.94)***  (2.76)*** 
Δ Secondary education, lagged  -0.002 -0.001  -0.002  -0.010 
 (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.05) 
Δ Ln population, lagged  7.037 6.759  6.739  6.236 
 (1.09)  (1.05)  (1.05)  (0.98) 
Δ Resource rent, lagged  0.002 0.002  0.002  0.002 
 (0.09)  (0.10)  (0.09)  (0.07) 
Constant -1.636  -0.396  2.274  -1.346 
 (0.09)  (0.02)  (0.12)  (0.08) 
Observations 1849  1849  1849  1849 
Countries 82  82  82  82 
Turning point in CYCLE (years)  2.5  2.8  2.8   
Robust z statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for intra-country correlation. * significant at 
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. DEPENDENT VARIABLE: Dummy = 1 when Δ CPIA is 
strictly positive. ESTIMATION METHOD: Logit with country fixed effects and year dummies. DATING 
OF ELECTIONS: The electoral dummy equals one in an election year and zero otherwise, no matter when 
during the year the election occurred. NEVER, FIRST, CYCLE and FREQUENCY are constructed 
according to this dating of elections.  Section 6. Extensions 
 
 
We now extend the analysis to investigate whether there are significant differences in our 
results according to the characteristics of countries.  
 
Doubts over the efficacy of elections in developing countries are particularly centred on 
the scope for subverting them. Incumbents can resort to several illicit means of retaining 
power. Our results so far have suggested that accountability works: by requiring 
governments to attract votes, elections induce them to adopt improved economic policies 
and governance. Potentially, if governments can retain power by other means they need 
not adjust policies to those wanted by the electorate but not by politicians themselves. We 
first investigate whether there is any quantitative evidence that the conduct of elections 
indeed affects economic policy. For this we rely upon an ordinal indicator of the quality 
of elections (see Appendix 2 for a precise definition). As might be expected, this 
indicator is itself of doubtful value. In particular, it does not use the assessment of 
external monitors who now often rate elections according to whether they are ‘free and 
fair’. However, it does assess them by the objective indicator of the proportion of seats 
won by the opposition. Unfortunately, while this is an indicator of whether the election 
was conducted in a manner than enabled the opposition to gain seats, it is also one that is 
evidently endogenous to government performance. Other things equal, an opposition will 
be more likely to win seats if the government has adopted, or looks likely to adopt, very 
poor economic policies. Hence, the quality indicator will be high not only in situations in 
which the electorate can indeed discipline the government by voting, but in situations in 
which the government has particularly failed to deliver what voters want. While we 
would expect the former effect to produce a positive link between the measured quality of 
elections and the chance of good policy, the latter effect is liable to produce the opposite 
association due to reverse causality. This provides an important caveat: our measure, 
QUALITY, is likely to be biased against clear results. 
 
Table 11 presents the results. We introduce QUALITY both directly and interacted with 
the structural political variable FREQUENCY across all seven of our approaches. The 
direct effect of QUALITY is significant in two of these regressions when using the ICRG 
as dependent variable, in both being positive. The more important issue is whether, 
controlling for this direct effect, QUALITY affects the structural efficacy of elections. In 
three of the seven regressions the interaction is significant, and in a fourth it is close to 
being so, in all four cases being negative. Further, in all four the coefficient on 
FREQUENCY now changes sign and becomes positive, sometimes significantly so. Yet 
more striking, in two of the remaining three regressions where the interaction is not 
significant, its addition destroys the significantly negative direct effect of FREQUENCY, 
this being the channel that captures the structural accountability effect of elections. Only 
in the regression of column (1) in which the dependent variable is the direction of change 
in the CPIA does it survive, but this is contradicted by the ordered probit results for the 
CPIA in column (7), which arguably captures more information from the CPIA data, 
where the coefficient switches to being positive. 
 Table 11. Quality of elections, 1978-2004 on 82 countries for CPIA, 1985-2005 on 70 countries for ICRG. 
Dependent variable  Dummy = 1 when Δ>0  Continuous Continuous  Ordered  CPIA  (0-9) 
Estimation method  LOGIT + FE  WITHIN  FIRST-DIFFERENCE  ORDERED PROBIT 
  CPIA ICRG  CPIA ICRG CPIA  ICRG CPIA 
  (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) 
Dummy NEVER had an election  -0.766  -0.179 -0.002  0.301  -0.093 -0.027  0.432 
  (1.26)  (0.16)  (0.02) (0.30) (0.85)  (0.02) (1.40) 
Dummy FIRST election  -0.738  0.298  0.027  0.209  -0.090  -0.118  0.534 
  (1.20)  (0.29)  (0.30) (0.22) (0.84)  (0.10) (1.70)* 
CYCLE  0.218  0.062 0.029  -0.068  0.034 0.104  0.102 
 (2.02)**  (0.49)  (2.11)**  (0.47)  (2.18)**  (0.77)  (1.86)* 
CYCLE squared  -0.042  -0.024  -0.006 -0.028 -0.009  -0.054 -0.022 
  (3.70)***  (1.68)*  (4.22)***  (1.80)* (2.52)**  (1.81)* (2.30)** 
FREQUENCY of elections  -0.177  0.181  -0.001  0.330  -0.014  0.240  0.041 
  (2.12)**  (1.34)  (0.09) (2.44)**  (0.70)  (1.43) (0.95) 
QUALITY  of  elections  (1-7)  0.055  0.159  0.022 0.310 -0.002  0.266 0.131 
  (0.50)  (0.99)  (1.38) (1.76)*  (0.12)  (1.39) (2.25)** 
FREQUENCY  x  QUALITY  0.007 -0.045  -0.002 -0.090 0.000  -0.077 -0.015 
 (0.37)  (1.81)*  (0.69)  (3.03)*** (0.08)  (2.47)**  (1.58)  (p-value=0.113) 
Dependent variable in level, lagged  -1.569  -0.146  0.725  0.799  -0.049  0.152  2.258 
  (8.51)***  (7.76)***  (35.94)*** (38.46)*** (1.70)*  (4.97)***  (19.43)*** 
Ln income p.c., lagged  3.925  0.438  0.604  1.750  0.428  20.359  1.059 
 (1.45)  (0.12)  (1.79)*  (0.35)  (0.63)  (1.58)  (0.85) 
Ln income p.c. squared, lagged  -0.295  0.001  -0.047 -0.171 -0.020  -1.042 -0.092 
 (1.63)  (0.00)  (2.04)**  (0.51)  (0.42)  (1.22)  (1.09) 
Secondary  education,  lagged  0.001  0.025  0.002 0.039 0.006  0.099 0.006 
 (0.04)  (0.60)  (1.92)*  (0.70)  (0.90)  (0.55)  (1.38) 
Ln population, lagged  -0.393  -0.075 -0.076  1.610  -0.473 13.216  -0.549 
  (0.32)  (0.05)  (0.49) (0.87) (0.77)  (1.42) (1.13) 
Resource rent, lagged  0.028  0.019  -0.000  0.051  0.004  0.169  -0.008 
 (1.72)*  (0.71)  (0.18)  (1.26)  (1.35)  (3.92)***  (1.34) 
Dummy AT WAR  -0.749  -0.894  -0.117 -1.216 -0.096  -1.635 -0.269 
 (2.82)***  (2.03)**  (2.90)***  (1.79)*  (1.60)  (2.59)**  (1.81)* 
Δ. Ln income p.c., lagged  -14.794  9.177        
  (2.92)***  (0.95)        
Δ. Ln income p.c. squared, lagged  1.123  -0.223        
  (3.05)***  (0.36)        Table 11. Continued. 
Δ. Secondary education, lagged  -0.003  0.129        
  (0.02)  (0.49)        
Δ. Ln population, lagged  7.408  20.044        
  (1.13)  (3.17)***        
Δ. Resource rent updated, lagged  0.003  0.049        
  (0.15)  (1.72)*        
Constant  -0.037  6.848 0.472  -20.575 0.045 0.515   
 (0.00)  (0.31)  (0.17)  (0.78)  (3.12)***  (2.58)**   
Observations (countries)  1849 (82)  1273 (70)  1849 (82)  1273 (70)  1771 (82)  1206 (70)  1849 (82) 
All regressions include year dummies. Robust z statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for intra-country correlation. * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The electoral dummy equals one in an election year and zero otherwise, no matter when during the year the election 
occurred. NEVER, FIRST, CYCLE and FREQUENCY are constructed according to this dating of elections. (1): p-value. 
 
 Taking these results as reliable for the moment, the meaning of this conjunction of 
coefficients is that frequent elections that are not of reasonable quality do not induce 
good economic policies and governance. On the contrary, they are more likely to lead to 
deterioration. It is only well-conducted elections that have the favourable structural 
effects on policy and governance. With the favourable structural effect lost, the only 
remaining effect of elections is cyclical: the further away is the society from an election 
the more likely is the government to improve policy and governance. However, this 
conclusion comes with a double caveat. The effect of QUALITY is notably less robust 
than our core results, and the variable, by its definition, is problematic. 
 
Finally, we investigate whether our results hold for the particular circumstances of low-
income countries and most especially, for those among them which have had a phase of 
very poor policies and governance. In Table 12, columns (1) to (4) the sample is 
restricted to low-income countries. We might expect that with the reduction in sample 
size there would be some loss of significance and this is indeed the case. However, in the 
core regession of column (1) the three key election variables all remain significant and 
their coefficients are virtually identical to the results from the full sample of developing 
countries. Hence, there appears to be no important distinctive effect of low income. 
 
In regressions (5) to (8) we further restrict the sample to ‘failing states’, these being 
countries which at some time during the observed period had very poor policies, defined 
as a CPIA score below 2.5. This level is commonly recognized by World Bank staff as 
being a threshold below which policies and governance are seen as overall highly 
problematic.  Column (5) reruns our core regression. All five election variables remain 
significant. This is an important result in that it suggests that our analysis is applicable in 
these contexts in which the improvement of economic policies and governance is most 
needed. The coefficient on FREQUENCY, which we have suggested captures the 
structural effect of accountability to the electorate, is virtually identical to that for the 
entire sample: elections appear to produce accountability over a wide range of economic 
development. The coefficients on CYCLE and its square are both somewhat larger than 
those for the full sample. Since the full sample of course contains this sub-sample is 
suggests that the cyclical effects may be more pronounced in failing states than in other 
developing countries. 
 
The final results concern the effects of adding QUALITY interacted with FREQUENCY 
to the regressions, both for low-income countries in general and failing states in 
particular. As we have just seen in Table 11, in our core CPIA regession (though in that 
alone) on our full sample of developing countries the direct effect of FREQUENCY 
remains significant. Now, on both our sub-samples, (columns (3) and (7)) it completely 
loses significance. The interaction terms themselves are not significant either in these two 
regressions, so not too much can be made of them. However, we may conclude weakly 
that in these societies there is little basis for believing that elections are structurally 
effective in disciplining governments into good policies regardless of their conduct.   
 Table 12. Estimation on failing states and low income countries. 
Dummy = 1 if ΔCPIA/ΔICRG >0  LOW-INCOME FAILING  STATES 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
 CPIA  ICRG  CPIA  ICRG  CPIA ICRG CPIA ICRG 
Dummy NEVER had an election  -0.612  -0.565  0.335 1.106  -0.797 -1.431 -0.444 -1.188 
  (1.26) (0.48) (0.28) (0.65)  (1.78)* (0.99)  (0.54)  (0.60) 
Dummy FIRST election  -0.561  -0.531  0.413 1.178  -0.757 -1.216 -0.365 -1.018 
  (1.29) (0.58) (0.37) (0.68)  (2.03)**  (1.33)  (0.48)  (0.56) 
CYCLE  0.240 0.124 0.242 0.095  0.316  0.043  0.327  0.031 
 (1.71)*  (0.65)  (1.59)  (0.48)  (2.19)**  (0.27)  (2.18)**  (0.19) 
CYCLE  squared  -0.044 -0.032 -0.044 -0.031  -0.052 -0.021 -0.053 -0.020 
 (3.33)***  (1.56)  (3.10)***  (1.52)  (3.69)***  (1.27)  (3.65)***  (1.22) 
FREQUENCY of elections  -0.157  0.040  -0.012  0.371  -0.157  0.060  -0.128  0.132 
  (3.12)***  (0.50)  (0.06)  (1.81)*  (4.00)***  (0.73) (1.04) (0.61) 
QUALITY of elections (1-7)      0.263  0.439      0.099  0.050 
    (1.00)  (1.72)*      (0.67)  (0.18) 
FREQUENCY  x  QUALITY    -0.042  -0.088      -0.007  -0.019 
    (0.69)  (2.03)**      (0.22)  (0.43) 
Dependent in level, lagged  -1.421  -0.128 -1.421 -0.133  -1.461  -0.134 -1.463 -0.136 
  (5.84)*** (4.28)*** (5.70)*** (4.17)***  (5.52)***  (4.65)***  (5.40)***  (4.55)*** 
Ln income p.c., lagged  7.555  -8.556  7.656  -7.533  4.232  -8.252  4.100  -7.095 
  (2.05)**  (1.09)  (2.21)**  (0.91)  (1.25) (1.13) (1.24) (0.88) 
Ln income p.c. squared, lagged  -0.561  0.644  -0.567  0.582  -0.304  0.611  -0.299  0.532 
  (2.09)**  (1.16)  (2.23)**  (0.98)  (1.23) (1.20) (1.23) (0.95) 
Secondary education, lagged  0.006  0.052 0.001 0.086  -0.037 -0.017 -0.041 -0.013 
  (0.13) (0.56) (0.03) (0.76)  (0.66)  (0.17)  (0.70)  (0.12) 
Ln population, lagged  3.444  -8.461  3.553 -8.044  4.242  -8.874 4.288  -8.599 
  (1.50) (2.00)**  (1.52) (1.79)*  (1.86)* (1.90)* (1.86)* (1.80)* 
Resource rent, lagged  0.050  0.064  0.049  0.060  0.033  0.049  0.034  0.047 
 (2.71)***  (1.11)  (2.83)***  (0.93)  (1.92)*  (1.02)  (2.03)**  (0.95) 
Dummy  AT  WAR  -0.358 -0.478 -0.372 -0.584  -0.562 -0.609 -0.550 -0.610 
  (0.76) (0.72) (0.79) (0.86)  (1.18)  (0.94)  (1.16)  (0.95) 
Δ Ln income p.c., lagged  -5.187 13.769 -5.761 11.451  -5.300 2.918  -4.289 2.034 
  (0.49) (0.79) (0.45) (0.71)  (0.53)  (0.19)  (0.39)  (0.14) 
Δ Ln income p.c. squared, lagged  0.336  -0.536  0.369  -0.382  0.358 0.200 0.285 0.263 
  (0.43) (0.46) (0.40) (0.35)  (0.49)  (0.19)  (0.36)  (0.27)  
Table 12. Continued. 
Δ Secondary education, lagged  -0.383  0.709 -0.302  0.938 -0.111  0.406  -0.043 0.388 
  (1.00) (0.79) (0.79) (1.04) (0.36) (0.49)  (0.13)  (0.48) 
Δ Ln population, lagged  18.126 36.626 17.505 36.222 13.228  42.179 13.249 41.664 
  (1.91)*  (3.68)*** (1.77)*  (3.69)*** (1.42)  (2.42)**  (1.42)  (2.39)** 
Δ Resource rent, lagged  -0.013  0.016 -0.011  0.016 -0.004  0.026  -0.004 0.026 
  (0.44) (0.34) (0.41) (0.30) (0.13) (0.52)  (0.13)  (0.52) 
Constant  -70.753 215.105 -73.745 193.769 -70.895 155.325  -72.105  147.270 
  (2.59)*** (2.69)*** (2.31)**  (2.43)**  (2.71)*** (2.74)***  (2.45)**  (2.64)*** 
Observations (countries)  834 (35)  509 (27)  834 (35)  509 (27)  811 (34)  488 (26)  811 (34)  488 (26) 
Joint-significance of CYCLE and its square  0.000  0.041  0.000  0.035  0.000  0.057  0.000  0.052 
Turning  point  in  CYCLE  (years)  2.7 1.9 2.8 1.5 3.0 1.0  3.1  0.8 
Robust z statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for intra-country correlation. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:   Dummy = 1 when Δ CPIA / Δ ICRG is strictly positive. 
ESTIMATION METHOD:   Logit with country fixed effects and year dummies.  
DATING OF ELECTIONS:   The electoral dummy equals one in an election year and zero otherwise, no matter when during the year the election occurred. 
NEVER, FIRST, CYCLE and FREQUENCY are constructed according to this dating of elections. 7. Implications and Conclusions 
 
 
Economic policy is critical for prosperity and so how it is shaped is of enormous 
importance for developing societies. It is now widely accepted that the struggle for good 
economic policies and governance is predominantly an internal process within these 
societies rather than something that can be imposed from outside by means of policy 
conditionality.  
 
Since the fall of the Soviet Union both pressure from the international community and 
internal pressures within these societies have promoted elections. This first wave of 
change is now largely complete: almost all societies have elections. Potentially, elections 
are the key institutional technology of democracy than enables citizens to hold 
governments to account. While the potential may seem self-evident, quantitative political 
science research has become rather sceptical of the efficacy of democracy in improving 
economic performance: the broad conclusion is that there is little if any overall 
relationship. This paper has revisited the relationship, focusing upon policy choices 
instead of economic performance, and on elections as events instead of generalized 
ratings of the extent to which the country is democratic. We have investigated whether 
elections have forced governments into policy improvement. 
 
We have found that elections have two offsetting effects. Because they are offsetting, 
unless they are distinguished the results are liable to be confused. Indeed, we showed that 
with a naïve approach of introducing a dummy variable for elections into a regression, 
elections appear to have no effect: as with the political science literature, this key aspect 
of democracy washes over the process of policy setting without trace. We might note that 
it is probably only by focusing on developing countries that these two effects can be 
distinguished: in developed countries there is liable to be too little variation, especially 
over time. 
 
However, once the two effects are separately distinguished, each is clear and robust. 
Elections in developing countries have cyclical effects on policy. The instinct of 
President Obasanjo of Nigeria that ‘the last year would be politics’ was quite consistent 
with our results: periods in the vicinity of elections are less propitious for policy 
improvement. How powerful is the cycle. In Figure 1 we show the probability of policy 
improvement year-by-year at the mean of other characteristics for an electoral cycle of 
six years. The probability increases from 0.37 in the year of the election to 0.44 during 
the mid-term. Hence, the effect is not large but worth bearing in mind: by choosing the 
right moment for change the probability of success is increased by around 20%. In this 
sense, elections are bad news for policy improvement, but not very bad news.  
 
More important that this cyclical effect is the structural effect of elections. They indeed 
produce accountability of government to citizens. The degree to which they do this 
depends upon their frequency: the more frequent the better. The net effect of higher 
frequency has to be computed while allowing for the implications of each frequency for 
the cyclical effects: a lower frequency reduces the adverse effect of an election year compared to the mid-terms. The net effect of different frequencies on the probability of 
policy improvement is shown in Figure 2. The effects are large: taking the extremes of 
the range, shifting from an election once a decade to an election each year would almost 
double the chance of policy improvement in the average year. Since our core results are 
robust whether they are done in levels or differences, this statement about policy 
improvement can be reformulated as one about the eventual level of policy: frequent 
elections produce better policy.  
 
Does this mean that concerns about elections are unwarranted? Our extension of the 
analysis to allow for variations in the quality of the conduct of elections suggests that 
there is indeed a sound basis for concern. While the results are less robust, there is a 
reasonable basis for concluding that if elections are badly conducted they lose their 
structural efficacy for policy improvement. This is surely what would be expected. Where 
governments resort to illicit means of securing electoral victory, such as bribery, ballot 
fraud and voter intimidation, they are released from the discipline of adopting good 
policies in order to win votes. Indeed, in order to resort to such strategies they may well 
need to adopt bad policies. An election which is not ‘free and fair’ is a broken 
technology: it cannot be expected to hold governments accountable to citizens. 
 
Hence, the overall conclusion from our analysis is that the frequency and conduct of 
elections matter. Of course, accountability to citizens can reasonably be viewed as a good 
in itself. However, our results suggest that it is also efficacious for economic policy and 
that elections are a key instrument in achieving accountability. Elections fail to achieve 
accountability if they are infrequent, and if they are mis-conducted.  
 
For international policy to promote development the results have an important, if 
uncomfortable, implication. It is widely accepted that good economic policy is critical to 
successful development. In the past the main approaches to foster good policy have been 
donor policy conditionality and technical assistance for ‘capacity-building’ but neither of 
these has had much success. Our results suggest that the route to policy improvement is 
through accountability of governments to their citizens through proper elections. To the 
extent that this process has failed it is because governments have subverted the electoral 
process. Hence, the international community needs to use its influence to reinforce the 
regular holding of elections and ensure that they are conducted to high standards. The 
development discourse of the last decade, replete with expressions such as ‘partnership’, 
‘country-led’, and ‘clients’, has critiqued the previous emphasis of the World Bank on 
good economic policies as measured by the CPIA as being incompatible with the 
preferences of these societies themselves: local preferences were being overridden. Yet 
when citizens are able to hold their governments to account, they appear to want a better 
CPIA. The task for the international community is thus to promote the effective 
accountability of government to citizen. For example, conditioning aid upon the proper 
conduct of regular elections appears, on the basis of our evidence, to be a reasonable use 
of aid for development.  
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 Appendix 1 – Definition of the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) 
 
 
A. Economic management  
      1. Management of inflation and macroeconomic imbalances 
      2. Fiscal policy 
      3. Management of external debt 
      4. Management and sustainability of the development program 
 
B. Structural policies  
      1. Trade policy and foreign exchange regime 
      2. Financial stability and depth 
      3. Banking sector efficiency and resource mobilization 
      4. Competitive environment for the private sector 
      5. Factor and product markets 
      6. Policies and institutions for environmental sustainability 
 
C. Policies for social inclusion / equity 
      1. Gender 
      2. Equity of public resource use 
      3. Building human resources 
      4. Social protection and labor 
      5. Monitoring and analysis of poverty outcomes and impacts 
 
D. Public sector management and institutions 
      1. Property rights and rule-based governance 
      2. Quality of budgetary and financial management 
      3. Efficiency of revenue mobilization 
      4. Quality of public administration 
      5. Transparency, accountability and corruption in the public sector 
Each of the twenty components of the CPIA is rated on a scale of 1–6. Appendix 2. Presentation of the data 
 
CPIA  
Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (World Bank). See Appendix 1. 
 
ICRG 
Composite indicator of political stability, economic stability and financial stability. It is 
rated from 0 (bad policy and institutions) to 100 (good policy and institutions). Source: 
International Country risk Guide, Political Risk Services. http://www.prsgroup.com/   
 
Income per capita  




World Development Indicators of the World Bank (2005). 
 
Secondary education 
Barro R. and J.W. Lee (2000) dataset. Percentage of the population who completed 




Natural resource rents (% of GDP). Resource Rents are calculated by summing the total 
value of rents for all extractive (i.e. non agricultural) resources. These values are in 
current US$ and are then divided by GDP in current US$. Source: Collier and Hoeffler 
(2005). 
 
Dummy at war 
Dummy equals one during civil war. Correlates of War (Singer and Small, 1994 ; Small 








We use executive elections for presidential systems and legislative elections for 
parliamentary systems.  
 
FREQUENCY:  the number of years between election in year t and the previous election. 
This number is reported for each year of the mandate.  
CYCLE:    the number of years that separate year t from the nearest election, 
whether this is the previous election or the next election.  
NEVER:   dummy which is equal to one if the country never had an election. FIRST:   dummy which is equal to one during the first mandate. 
QUALITY:   quality of previous election. It is constructed using the EIEC and LIEC 
variables of the DPI database (respectively Executive and Legislative 
Indices of Electoral Competitiveness). It takes the values: 1: No 
legislature; 2: Unelected legislature; 3: Elected, 1 candidate; 4: 1 party, 
multiple candidates; 5: multiple parties are legal but only one party won 
seats; 6: multiple parties did win seats but the largest party received 
more than 75% of the seats; 7: largest party got less than 75%. If, for 
example, elections occur in years t and t+4, we report the value of 
EIEC/LIEC in t (depending on whether the political system is 
presidential or parliamentary) during the whole duration of the mandate 
starting in t+4.   
 
We also use the database on elections used by Brender and Drazen (2005). 
http://www.econ.umd.edu/~drazen/ 
 Appendix 3. Sample 
 
Developing countries in the main sample  Using ICRG data  Using DRAZEN data 
Algeria x  
Argentina x x 
Barbados   
Belize   
Bolivia x x 
Botswana x  
Brazil x x 
Bulgaria x x 
Chile x x 
China x  
Colombia x x 
Costa Rica x  x 
Croatia x  
Czech Republic x  x 
Dominican Rep. x  x 
Ecuador x x 
El Salvador x  x 
Fiji  x 
Guatemala x x 
Hungary x x 
India x x 
Jamaica x  
Jordania x  
Kenya x  
Korea x x 
Malawi x  
Malaysia x x 
Mauritius  x 
Mexico x x 
Panama x x 
Paraguay x x 
Peru x x 
Philippines x x 
Poland x x 
Romania x x 
Russia x x 
Slovakia x x 
South Africa x  x 
St. Lucia    
Swaziland   
Syria x  
Thailand x  
Trinidad and Tobago x  x 
Tunisia x  
Turkey x x 
Uruguay x x 
Venezuela x x 




 Appendix 3. continued. 
 
Failing States in the main sample  Using ICRG data  Using DRAZEN data 
Bangladesh x  
Benin   
Burundi   
Cameroon x  
Central African Rep    
Congo, Rep x   
Democratic Rep. Of Congo x   
Egypt x  
Ethiopia x  
Gambia x   
Ghana x  
Haiti x  
Honduras x  x 
Indonesia x  
Lesotho   
Liberia x  
Mali x x 
Mauritania   
Mozambique x  
Nepal  x 
Nicaragua x x 
Niger x  
Papua New Guinea x  x 
Pakistan x x 
Rwanda   
Senegal x  
Sierra Leone x   
Sri Lanka x  x 
Sudan x  
Togo x  
Uganda x  
Vietnam   
Zambia x  
Zimbabwe x  
 